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"IN STARK CONTRAVENTION OF 
ITS PURPOSE": FEDERAL 
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION 
ENFORCEMENT AND REPEAL OF 
THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE• 
The fairness doctrine1 has long been a controversial feature of 
broadcast regulation. Attacked on constitutional grounds as an 
infringement of first amendment rights and on public policy 
grounds as poor law, the doctrine has now been abandoned by 
its enforcer, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or 
Commission). In August 1987, the FCC concluded that the fair-
ness doctrine "contravenes the First Amendment and thereby 
disserves the public interest."2 Although the Commission did 
not formally attempt to repeal the fairness doctrine until 1987, a 
review of FCC enforcement of the doctrine reveals that, begin-
ning in 1981, the FCC restricted the use of the doctrine through 
• "In stark contravention of its purpose, the Commission determined that the 
fairness doctrine in operation inhibited the presentation of controversial issues of public 
importance." General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 50 Fed. Reg. 
35,418, 35,418 (1985). 
1. The doctrine creates two responsibilities for the broadcaster: (1) The broadcaster 
must devote a reasonable amount of broadcasting time to controversial issues of public 
importance; and (2) such broadcasting must include an opportunity for the presentation 
of contrasting points of view. The fairness doctrine is codified as a federal regulation at 
47 C.F.R. §§ 73.1910, 76.209 (1986) and as federal law in the Communications Act of 
1934, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1982). The doctrine contains several subparts. One component is 
the personal attack rule, in which an individual attacked during the coverage of a contro-
versial issue of public importance has the right to defend herself over the broadcaster's 
airwaves. The "equal time" rule, a rule similar to and supported by the fairness doctrine, 
see infra note 36, also appears in § 315 of the Communications Act. Section 315 man-
dates that political candidates for federal office have equal opportunity to gain access to 
. a broadcaster's airwaves. 
This Note deals only with the controversy surrounding the fairness doctrine and does 
not consider the broadcaster's responsibilities to political candidates under § 315. 
2. Syracuse Peace Council, 63 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 541, 589, appeal docketed, No. 
87-1516 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 14, 1987). See generally Geller v. FCC, No. 87-1544 (D.C. Cir. 
Oct. 5, 1987) (challenging FCC repeal of the fairness doctrine). The decision was pre-
ceded by the 1985 Fairness Report, General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast 
Licensees, 50 Fed. Reg. 35,418 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 Fairness Report], which came to 
similar conclusions but declined to repeal the doctrine, believing the doctrine was statu-
torily mandated. 
799 
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changes in administrative procedures that amounted to a de 
facto repeal. 
This Note analyzes current FCC policy to determine whether 
the agency violated its statutory purpose and acted unlawfully 
by restricting and later repealing the fairness doctrine. Because 
the Commission's attack on the doctrine has been based, in part, 
on conclusions drawn from the doctrine's history, Part I exam-
ines prior FCC enforcement of the fairness doctrine. Part II 
views the Commission's contemporary enforcement and repeal of 
the doctrine. Finally, Part III assesses Commission action in 
light of its legislative mandate and administrative law standards 
of judicial review to conclude that the FCC both violated its ad-
ministrative responsibilities by deemphasizing enforcement of 
the fairness doctrine and acted illegally in repealing it. 
I. TRADITIONAL FCC MANDATES AND METHODS 
The agencies charged with enforcement of the fairness doc-
trine have always invoked it to serve the interests of the listen-
ing and viewing public. These interests, however, have been vari-
ously interpreted. The Commission, broadcast licensees, and the 
courts have taken different action over the years to follow and 
enforce the doctrine. 
A. Genesis of the Fairness Doctrine 
The fairness doctrine evolved from the administrative policies 
of the Federal Radio Commission (FRC) and its successor, the 
Federal Communications Commission. From its inception, the 
FRC conditioned issuance of broadcast licenses to applicants on 
their ability to meet the congressional standard of service to the 
public interest. 3 The FRC interpreted the public interest rule to 
3. 1927 Radio Act, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162, incorporated in the Communi-
cations Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 303 {1982 & Supp. III 1985) {section 18 of the Act 
empowered the Commission to act "as public convenience, interest, or necessity re-
quires"). From very early on, the FRC enforced the public interest standard to include 
content restrictions mandating balanced broadcasting. See, e.g., 1 FED. RADIO COMM'N 
ANN. REP. 159 {1927) {order concerning station WRAK); id. at 152 {order concerning 
station WCOT); id. at 154 {order concerning station WEVD). 
Radio licensing actually began with the 1912 Radio Act, under which the Department 
of Commerce issued licenses. Radio Communications Act of Aug. 13, 1912, 47 U.S.C. § 
51-60 {repealed 1927). A string of federal court rulings, however, held that the Act did 
not empower the Secretary of Commerce to refuse to issue licenses. See, e.g., Hoover v. 
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require fair reporting of "public questions."" This action created 
one prong of the current fairness doctrine: the requirement of 
balance. The Commission stated, "It would not be fair, indeed it 
would not be good service, to the public to allow a one-sided 
presentation of the political issues of a campaign . . . . [The] 
public interest requires ample play for the free and fair competi-
tion of opposing views .... "11 When the broadcaster did pre-
sent an issue of public importance, opposing viewpoints on the 
matter had to be presented as well. 
To enforce this rudimentary requirement of fairness, the FRC 
established logging requirements in 1931.6 By requiring radio 
Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1923); United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 
F.2d 614 (N.D. Ill. 1926). Moreover, these decisions prevented the Secretary from as-
signing frequencies to broadcasters and from mandating that broadcasters stay within 
their frequencies. The resultant cacophonous anarchy led the public and the industry to 
request, and the Congress to enact, the Radio Act of 1927. W. OVERBECK & R. PULLEN, 
MAJOR PRINCIPLES OF MEDIA LAW 248 (1982). 
4. Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 FED. RADIO CoMM'N ANN. REP. 32 (1929), rev'd on 
other grounds, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 281 U.S. 706 (1930). 
5. Id. at 33. The Commission inferred that broadcasters were required to cover issues 
of public interest from § 18 of the Radio Act of 1927. Like§ 315 of the 1934 Communica-
tions Act, §18 required equal opportunities for all political candidates to have access to 
the airwaves. "[T]he commission believes that the principle [of fairness] applies not only 
to addresses by political candidates but to all discussions of issues of importance to the 
public." Id. 
In Young People's Association for the Propagation of the Gospel, 6 F.C.C. 178 (1940), 
the FCC rejected a license application from a religious group, the YPAPG, on the 
grounds that they would not present diverse viewpoints on religious issues and that this 
would violate the fairness requirement of the public interest standard. See also Chicago 
Fed'n of Labor v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 3 FED. RADIO CoMM'N ANN. REP. 36 (1929) 
(rejecting a union's application for a broadcasting station due to the likelihood of biased 
coverage of industrial issues). 
The FRC policy reversed the relaxed standards previously used by the Department of 
Commerce to allocate frequencies under the 1912 act. During the 1920's, the Department 
followed the accepted practice of allowing some interest groups to receive broadcast fre-
quencies. For example, station WCBD, which broadcast only the services and philoso-
phies of Zion Temple from Zion, Illinois, received its broadcast license in 1924. By 1930, 
however, a restructuring of the frequencies in the Chicago area required the FCC to weed 
out stations and redistribute their frequencies. The Commission excluded WCBD from 
the spectrum on public interest grounds due to its imbalanced programming. Great 
Lakes Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 37 F.2d 993, 994 (1930), rev'g on 
other grounds, 3 FED. RADIO CoMM'N ANN. REP. 32 (1929). 
6. 5 FED. RADIO CoMM'N ANN. REP. 96 (1931) (General Order No. 106). But see Dereg-
ulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, 1111 (1981) ("Comprehensive program logs similar to 
those kept today have been required since the beginning of radio regulation, but the 
official documents contain very little discussion of their regulatory purpose or effect."). 
Yet, early FRC rules and practices show that the logs and logging procedures were an 
essential part of the Commission's attempt to uphold the public interest standard 
through content regulation. The rules and regulations of the FRC specifically required 
that logs include comments on the content of the broadcast. FEDERAL RADIO COMM'N, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 46 (1931) [hereinafter F.R.C. RULES AND REGULATIONS]. For ex-
ample,~ 172(A)(b) requires the broadcaster to log a description of the program broadcast 
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stations to keep records on the political backgrounds of speakers 
and the subjects of broadcasts, the FRC was able to monitor re-
ports of unfair reporting and political bias.7 By reviewing these 
logs at the time of license renewal, the FRC decided whether the 
broadcaster had followed the public interest requirement of bal-
anced programming. 
In the 1940's, the FCC further defined the nebulous FRC fair-
ness requirement through agency decisions. In Mayfiower 
Broadcasting Corp.,8 for example, the Commission evaluated the 
actions of a Boston radio station that presented editorials sup-
porting only those candidates who were friends of the broad-
caster and only those issues favored by the broadcaster. The 
Commission ruled that "the broadcaster cannot be an advo-
cate. "9 To protect against political bias, the Commission out-
lawed all political editorializing by finding that such broadcast-
ing violated the public interest standard of the Communications 
Act.10 
The Commission extended their public interest requirements 
in United Broadcasting Co., 11 adding a requirement that broad-
casters present important public questions.12 Broadcasters com-
particularly, "(i]f a speech is made by a political candidate, the name and political affili-
ations of such speaker shall be entered." Id. Paragraph 173 provides that the logs be 
made available upon the request of government representatives. Id. The Commission 
used logs in making decisions and in assessing services offered by different broadcasters. 
5 FED. RADIO COMM'N ANN. REP. 40, 51 (1931) (using information from logs to examine 
emergency broadcasting services); see also id. at 60, 61 (report of the General Counsel 
discussing activities of the complaint and investigation subsection of the Commission 
legal department, work that appears to have required use of logs to judge program con-
tent); Note, Regulation of Program Content by the FCC, 77 HARV. L. REV. 701, 701 
(1964) (reporting that the Federal Radio Commission based licensing decisions on pro-
gram content information). 
7. F.R.C. RULES AND REGULATIONS, supra note 6, 11 172(A). 
8. 8 F.C.C. 333 (1940). 
9. Id. at 340. 
10. Id. A recent attempt to ensure fairness in broadcasting also involved a prohibi-
tion on editorializing. The Public .Broadcasting Act of 1967 forbade any noncommercial 
educational broadcasting station that received federal funds from editorializing. Pub. L. 
No. 90-129, tit. II, § 201(8), 81 Stat. 365, 368 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. 399 
(1982)). The Supreme Court struck down the act as unconstitutional on first amendment 
grounds in FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984). 
11. 10 F.C.C. 515 (1945). 
12. In United Broadcasting Co., the FCC evaluated a policy of WHKC of Columbus, 
Ohio, which forbade the sale of time to programs that solicited membership, or discussed 
race, religion, or politics. At the time of the station's license renewal, unions complained 
to the FCC that the station discriminated in enforcing its policy and that the station 
used the policy to censor the voice of labor. The Commission ruled that the broadcaster's 
policy of refusing to sell time for the broadcast of controversial issues was "inconsistent 
with the concept of the public interest established by the Communications Act" because 
it excluded labor issues from the airwaves. Id. at 518; see also Scott, 3 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 
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plied with this duty only if they presented issues of public con-
cern. The requirement to cover public issues, then, became the 
other prong of the fairness doctrine. 13 
These early decisions left broadcasters with a set of contradic-
tory instructions for serving the public interest. The broadcaster 
had to present balanced reporting on controversial issues; in-
deed, the FCC mandated that these issues be covered. Yet, the 
FCC forced the broadcaster to stand mute in the controversy, 
forbidding her from expressing an opinion. The balanced view-
point had to come from other sources who were allowed to speak 
over the station's airwaves. 14 
Broadcasters' problems in administering and interpreting the 
law led to the FCC 1949 Report on Editorializing by Broadcast 
Licensees.111 The report reaffirmed that the public interest stan-
dard announced by Congress in the Communications Acts of 
1927 and 1934 demanded the fairness requirements that the 
Commission promulgated.16 Specifically, in digesting its earlier 
rulings on the public interest standard, the Commission found 
that the broadcaster could now present her own viewpoints in 
the form of editorials. This policy better served the Commis-
sion's requirement that broadcasters present a balanced view of 
issues. 17 Emphasizing that the requirement of fairness rested 
259 (1946) (extending the duty of coverage to all subjects of substantial importance to 
the community). 
Many stations adopted the WHKC policy of restricting controversial issues to avoid 
"public interest" challenges brought when the FCC renewed station licenses. The Na-
tional Association of Broadcasters (NAB) promulgated this policy in its Code. The Code 
provided that "[N)o time shall be sold for the presentation of public controversial issues, 
with the exception of political broadcasts and the public forum type of programs; and 
that solicitation of memberships in organizations, whether on paid or free time, should 
not be permitted." United Broadcasting Co., 10 F.C.C. at 516. The NAB's reasoning, 
that the best way to avoid a challenge to the broadcaster's fair news coverage is to avoid 
any controversial issues, is precisely the type of reasoning cited by the FCC in its 1985 
Fairness Report as evidence of a chilling effect. See infra notes 78-88 and accompanying 
text. 
The Commission thus recognized "the duty [on the part of broadcasters) to be sensi-
tive to the problems of public concern in the community." United Broadcasting Co., 10 
F.C.C. at 517. 
13.° This first prong is rarely enforced by the Commission. Only one case based on the 
first prong requirement that broadcasters present controversial issues has been decided 
against a broadcaster. In that case, Patsy Mink, 59 F.C.C.2d 987 (1976), a broadcaster 
failed to present any coverage of the issue of strip mining, an issue that was found to be 
of vital importance to the West Virginia community served by the broadcaster. The 
Commission's decision required that the broadcaster present to the Commission his plan 
for covering the issue. 
14. See generally Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949). 
15. Id. 
16. Id. at 1248. 
17. Id. 
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upon the licensee's good faith and discretion, the Report noted, 
"It should be recognized that there can be no one all embracing 
formula which licensees can hope to apply to insure the fair and 
balanced presentation of all public issues. " 18 
By the late 1940's, the Commission had molded the fairness 
doctrine into its present form. By interpreting legislation, decid-
ing administrative cases, and promulgating policy, the Commis-
sion had created a doctrine mandating that broadcasters (1) pre-
sent controversial issues of public importance and (2) present 
such issues in a fair and balanced manner. The Commission en-
forced these policies by primarily relying on the broadcaster's 
good will and discretion. 
B. The Fairness Doctrine from 1959 to 1981 
Between 1959 and 1981 the fairness doctrine developed from 
an administrative guideline to a congressionally enacted rule of 
law. Supreme Court action validated this development of the 
doctrine. Further, in keeping with the more formal status of the 
fairness doctrine and the growth of the broadcast industry, the 
Commission refined its enforcement mechanisms to better adapt 
the doctrine to changing circumstances. 
1. Codification in the 1959 amendment- In 1959, Congress 
enacted an amendment that most believe codified the fairness 
doctrine.19 The 1959 amendment read: "Nothing in the foregoing 
sentence shall be construed as relieving broadcasters . . . from 
the obligation imposed upon them under this chapter to operate 
in the public interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for 
the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public impor-
tance. "20 The legislative intent of the framers in regard to this 
provision is difficult to isolate. Most debate concentrated on 
18. Id. at 1251. 
19. E.g., F. ROWAN, BROADCAST FAIRNESS: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE, PROSPECTS 8 (1984); S. 
SIMMONS, THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE AND THE MEDIA 46-53 (1978); H. ZUCKMAN & M. 
GAYNES, MASS CoMMUNICATIONS LAW 370 (1977); Fein, First Class First Amendment 
Rights for Broadcasters, 10 HARV. J.L. & Pua. PoL'Y 81, 81 n.l (1987). But see S. SIM-
MONS, supra, at 52 n.223 (noting opponents to the codification argument). See generally 
105 CoNG. REC. 16,223-46 (1959) (House debate); 105 CONG. REC. 14,438-63 (1959) (Sen-
ate debate); 105 CoNG. REC. 17,776-82 (1959) (House debate on Conference Report); 105 
CoNG. REC. 17,827-32 (1959) (Senate debate on Conference Report). For Commission ac-
ceptance of the 1959 amendment as codification, see infra note 30 and accompanying 
text. For judicial interpretation of the amendments as codification, see infra notes 34-40 
and accompanying text. 
20. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1982). 
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other amendments to the Communications Act, not the fairness 
issue.21 The wording of the amendment either created and codi-
fied the Commission's fairness doctrine as a statutory obligation, 
or it ensured merely that the other amendment made to section 
315, the political candidate clause, would be read consonantly 
with the Commission's discretionary fairness doctrine 
regulation. 22 
The derivation of the ambiguous terms, however, indicates 
that the former interpretation is more correct. The section's lan-
guage grew out of a House-Senate reconciliation of the House 
version of the bill, which dealt solely with the section 315 politi-
cal candidate issue, 23 and the Senate version, which included an 
amendment by Senator Proxmire that was intended to codify 
the doctrine. 24 The Conference included Proxmire's amendment 
21. The central issue in the debate was an amendment overruling the Commission's 
Lar Daly decision, 19 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1104 (1960). See generally 1985 Fairness Re-
port, supra note 2, at 35,449, 35,453 (discussing the original purpose of the 1959 Con-
gress in amending § 315). 
22. 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 2, at 35,448, 35,453. 
23. Only two representatives referred to the fairness doctrine. Representative Celler 
expressed dissatisfaction with the media's coverage of controversial issues and stated, 
"That is why we want to enact a bill to insure there will be some restraint upon the 
networks and the broadcast stations to operate on the basis of fairness in presenting 
opposing points of view." 105 CONG. REC. 16,228 (1959). Representative Stratton dis-
cussed the Commission's public interest responsibility to present balanced reporting of 
controversial issues. Id. at 16,242. 
24. Senator Proxmire's amendment stated: 
[B]ut nothing in this sentence shall be construed as changing the basic intent of 
Congress with respect to the provisions of this act, which recognizes that televi-
sion and radio frequencies are in the public domain, that the license to operate 
in such frequencies requires operation in the public interest, and that in news-
casts, news interviews, news documentaries, on-the-spot coverage of news events, 
and panel discussions, all sides of public controversies shall be given as equal an 
opportunity to be heard as is practically possible. 
Id. at 14,457. 
Proxmire described the amendment as requiring the broadcaster to "consider all sides of 
public controversies .... ". Id. The sponsor of the original legislation, Senator Pastore, 
accepted the amendment as covering ground separate from the main issue of the 
legislation: ' 
[The Proxmire] amendment has nothing to do with legally qualified candidates, 
but is merely a requirement that broadcasters shall live and abide by the rule of 
fairness in connection with all controversial issues, so as to bring them, insofar 
as possible, fairly to the attention of the public as a whole. Of course that is the 
law today. 
Id. at 14,462; see also Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC, 806 F.2d 
P15, 1116-17 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Mikva, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane), 
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3196 (1987). But see 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 2, at 
35,449 n.363 (questioning whether the Proxmire amendment would indeed have codified 
the fairness doctrine). 
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with minor changes in the final version of the bill26 such that 
Senators were able to state that Congress had adopted a policy 
"to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflict-
ing views on issues of public importance."26 
Evidence supporting the view that the amendment was in-
tended simply to preserve the Commission's version of the fair-
ness doctrine against possible conflicts with the new political 
candidate section appears in the House debate on the Confer-
ence Report. Although debate concentrated on the political can-
didate rules, some representatives discussed whether the final 
version of the bill retained the fairness standard. They con-
cluded that the bill retained the fairness doctrine.27 Nothing in 
this exchange, however, indicates that the Conference Commit-
tee version of the bill did not go beyond simple retention of the 
fairness doctrine and codify the doctrine into law.28 Later action 
by Congress supports this viewpoint. 29 
25. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1069, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE 
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2582, 2584. The conferees adopted the Proxmire amendment stat-
ing, "The conferees feel that there is nothing in this language which is inconsistent with 
the House substitute. It is a restatement of the basic policy of the 'standard of fairness' 
which is imposed on broadcasters under the Communications Act of 1934." Id. But see 
infra note 35 (the Red Lion Court noting that the Conference Committee altered the 
Proxmire amendment from a positive statement of the doctrine to mere approving 
language). 
26. 105 CONG. REC. 17,831 (1959) (statement of Sen. Scott) ("We have maintained 
very carefully the spirit of the Proxmire amendment .... "). Senator Case echoes Sena-
tor Scott. Id. at 17,832. 
27. 105 CONG. REC. 17,778-79 (1959) (exchange between Reps. Avery and Harris). 
28. The 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 2, at 35,450, argues that this exchange 
"lends support to the contrary position that Congress intended solely to preserve the 
fairness doctrine" rather than to codify it. The only other statements that would lend 
credence to this notion appear in statements made before the Proxmire amendment was 
presented and modified by the Conference Committee into the present statutory lan-
guage. See 105 CONG. REC. 14,439 (1959) (statement of Sen. Pastore). No one in Congress 
spoke against codifying the fairness doctrine, but some did speak generally against 
broadcast regulation. See, e.g., id. at 17,781-82 (statements of Rep. Brown). 
29. Due to the codification of the fairness doctrine in 1959, no attempt to codify the 
doctrine was made between 1959 and 1985. Only since the 1985 Fairness Report's conclu-
sion that the doctrine's codification was uncertain has Congress attempted to recodify 
the doctrine. See infra Part Il(D)(2). 
Key participants in the 1959 proceedings have testified that their intent was to codify 
the fairness doctrine. 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 2, at 35,452 & nn.404-05 (citing 
Equal Time: Hearings on S. 251, S. 252, S. 1696 and H.R.J. Res. 247 Before the Sub-
comm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1963); Fairness Doctrine: Hearings on S. 2, S. 606 and S. 1178 Before the Subcomm. on 
Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1975) 
(statements of Sens. Pastore and Proxmire)). But compare the 1985 Fairness Report, 
supra note 2, at 35,452 (citing the STAFF STUDY FOR HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND 
FOREIGN COMMERCE. 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) [hereinafter the MANELLI REPORT) and 
concluding that Congress had no intent to codify the fairness doctrine in 1959) with Red 
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Commission reaction demonstrated its acceptance of the new 
statutory position of the fairness doctrine. From 1959 until the 
1980's, the Commission based its actions directly on the congres-
sional amendment of 1959, rather than the public interest stan-
dard of the Communications Act of 1934. 3° Far from being sim-
ply a showing of the consensus accepting the fairness doctrine 
codification within the 1959 amendments, the Commission's con-
struction of the statute is considered binding in the absence of 
compelling indications that it is wrong.31 The Commission's con-
tinued acceptance of the fairness doctrine as a legislatively im-
posed responsibility, as shown by the Commission's general 
practice, gives that interpretation a patina of legitimacy that can 
become binding as law.32 
2. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC: Codification and con-
stitutionality of the fairness doctrine- The Supreme Court 
strengthened the interpretation that the 1959 amendment codi-
fied the fairness doctrine in the first challenge to the doctrine, 
the seminal case of Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.33 In Red 
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, a Pennsylvania broadcaster chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the personal attack component of 
the fairness doctrine. 34 The Supreme Court concluded that the 
1959 amendments, although ambiguous, expressly recognized the 
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 n.11 (1969) (citing the MANELLI REPORT, 
supra, but reaching a different conclusion). 
30. Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC, 806 F.2d 1115, 1118 (D.C. 
Cir. 1986) (Mikva, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane), cert. denied, 107 S. 
Ct. 3196 (1987); see also Deregulation of Radio, supra note 6, at 974; Applicability of the 
Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 29 Fed. 
Reg. 10,415, 10,416 (1964) [hereinafter the Primer]; The Handling of Public Issues 
Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications 
Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 6 n.6 (1974) [hereinafter 1974 Fairness Report]. "The legislative his-
tory [of the 1959 amendments] establishes that this provision is a restatement of the 
basic policy of the 'standard of fairness' which is imposed on broadcasters under the 
Communications Act of 1934. [Quoting the congressional debates] ... Section 315 thus 
embodies both the 'equal opportunities' requirement and the fairness doctrine." Id. 
(footnotes omitted). 
31. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 381, 384 & n.9 (1969) (noting that courts should defer to an 
agency's construction of a statute especially when Congress has failed to overturn that 
construction). Although in Red Lion, the Court is discussing the Commission's early in-
terpretation of the public interest standard, the same rule of deference would apply to 
the Commission's interpretation of the 1959 amendments. This is due in part to a re-
viewing court's deference to Commission authority in its field of expertise. 
32. S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 417 (2d 
ed. 1985). This accretion of legitimacy surrounding agency acceptance of a certain policy 
is also evident in the fact that elimination of such a long-standing policy may cause a 
reviewing court to invoke the "hard look" doctrine. See infra note 192 and accompany-
ing text. 
33. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
34. See supra note 1 (discussing the personal attack rule). 
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fairness doctrine in statutory law. 811 The Court, emphasizing the 
language and the legislative history of the amendment, deter-
mined that the fairness doctrine was essential to the workings of 
the rest of the statutorily enacted political candidate section. 86 
The Red Lion Court also sustained the constitutionality of the 
fairness doctrine, basing its decision on the scarcity rationale87 
and the lack of any documented chilling effect from the opera-
tion of the doctrine. 88 The Court concluded that the fairness 
doctrine had no such chilling effect and, instead, served the pub-
lic interest by ensuring the public discussion of controversial is-
sues. Thus, the Court in Red Lion viewed the fairness doctrine 
35. 
This language [of the 1959 amendment] makes it very plain that Congress, in 
1959, announced that the phrase "public interest," which had been in the Act 
since 1927, imposed a duty on broadcasters to discuss both sides of controversial 
public issues . . . . Here the Congress has not just kept its silence by refusing to 
overturn the administrative construction, but has ratified it with positive 
legislation. 
Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 380. The conclusions of the Court on the 1959 amendment, how-
ever, are worded ambiguously. They could be read as concluding that the 1959 amend-
ment either simply "supported," "acknowledged," "accepted," and "vindicated" the 
Commission's regulations, without specifically codifying them into congressional legisla-
tion, or that Congress did indeed give the doctrine "specific recognition in statutory 
form." Statements appear supporting both views. See, e.g., id. at 383-84 (noting that the 
Proxmire amendment "constituted a positive statement of doctrine and was altered to 
the present merely approving language in the Conference Committee," and reasserting 
the public interest standard of the 1934 Communications Act (emphasis added)). 
36. Id. at 382-83. Justice White argued that§ 315's "equal opportunity" provision for 
political candidates would be undermined without the fairness doctrine. The purpose of 
§ 315 was to prevent broadcasters from becoming totally partisan in an election by re-
quiring the broadcasters to give equal opportunities for appearances to both candidates. 
Just.ice White envisioned that, without the fairness doctrine, a broadcaster could exclude 
the candidates altogether and "deliver over his station entirely to the supporters of one 
slate of candidates .... " Id. at 383. To prevent such a circumvention of the statute, 
Justice White inferred, Congress included the fairness doctrine in the provision. 
37. The scarcity rationale justifies special regulation of the broadcast media due to 
the limited availability of broadcast frequencies in relation to the number of individuals 
who wish to broadcast. See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (announcing the 
scarcity rationale for broadcast regulation). In the face of arguments that the prolifera-
tion of broadcast frequencies had destroyed the scarcity rationale, the Court reiterated, 
"Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is permitted to put re-
straints on licensees in favor of others whose views should be expressed on this unique 
medium." Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390. 
38. To the broadcaster's argument that the fairness doctrine had a "chilling effect," 
deterring free speech by threatening government suppression, the Court responded, 
"[t)he fairness doctrine in the past has had no such overall effect." Red Lion Broadcast-
ing Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 393 (1969). But the Court noted, "[l)f experience with the 
administration of these doctrines indicates that they have the net effect of reducing 
rather than enhancing the volume and quality of coverage, there will be time enough to 
reconsider the constitutional implications." Id; see also FCC v. League of Women Voters, 
468 U.S. 364, 378 n.12 (1984) (reiterating that evidence of a chilling effect would justify a 
review of the fairness doctrine's constitutionality). 
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as being both based on congressional legislation and supported 
by a strong constitutional foundation. 39 Lower courts, although 
still using the ambiguous language of the Red Lion Court, have 
treated the 1959 amendments as a codification of the doctrine. 40 
3. FCC development of the fairness doctrine- Even before 
the Red Lion decision, the FCC recognized the new status of the 
fairness doctrine. A 1964 FCC report, called "the Primer,"41 di-
gested FCC rulings on the fairness doctrine, noting that the doc-
trine was now mandated by Congress. 42 The Primer recognized 
that the 1949 Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees 
remained the Commission's basic policy statement on the doc-
trine, yet set forth new FCC procedures that enhanced the ear-
lier guidelines for enforcing the fairness doctrine. 
Although the Commission had previously considered fairness 
doctrine violations at licensing and license renewal times, 43 the 
Primer stated that the Commission would now accept com-
plaints from the public at the time of the broadcast. 44 If the 
39. The petitioners also challenged the fairness doctrine on the grounds that the reg-
ulations were unconstitutionally vague. The Court dismissed this argument, stating, 
"[W]e cannot conclude that the FCC has been left a free hand to vindicate its own idio-
syncratic conception of the public interest or of the requirements of free speech." Red 
Lion, 395 U.S. at 395. 
40. Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC, 806 F.2d 1115, 1117-18 
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (Mikva, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane), cert. denied, 
107 S. Ct. 3196 (1987); 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 2, at 35,452; see also CBS v. 
Democratic Nat'] Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 129-30 (1973) (discussing the "independent statu-
tory obligation to provide full and fair coverage of public issues ... [that] Congress has 
imposed on all broadcast licensees"); Kennedy for President Comm. v. FCC, 636 F.2d 
432, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Straus Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 530 F.2d 1001, 1007 n.11 
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (noting the fairness doctrine's "explicit statutory enactment[] in the 
1959 amendment"); Green v. FCC, 447 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1971). But see League of 
Women Voters, 468 U.S at 379 n.12 (1984) ("Of course, the Commission may, in the 
exercise of its discretion, decide to modify or abandon [the fairness doctrine and its com-
ponents], and we express no view on the legality of either course."); Public Interest Re-
search Group v. FCC, 522 F.2d 1060 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 965 (1976). 
41. The Primer, supra note 30. 
42. Id. at 10,416. 
43. See, e.g., United Broadcasting Co., 10 F.C.C. 515 (1945) (fairness review applied 
at renewal time); Young Peoples Ass'n for Propagatio~ of the Gospel, 6 F.C.C. 178 (1938) 
(fairness decision made at time of application); see also supra note 12 (discussing United 
Broadcasting Co.). • 
44. 
Where complaint is made to the Commission, the Commission expects a com-
plainant to submit specific information indicating (1) the particular station in-
volved; (2) the particular issue of a controversial nature discussed over the air; 
(3) the date and time when the program was carried; (4) the basis for the claim 
that the station has presented only one side of the question; and (5) whether the 
station had afforded or has plans to afford, an opportunity for the presentation 
of contrasting viewpoints. [The complainant can usually obtain this information 
by communicating with the station.] 
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complaint seemed well-grounded, the FCC would forward, it to 
the licensee for a reply. If the reply was insufficient, the Com-
mission would then begin a hearing on the complaint. 411 This new 
procedure increased the Commission's responsiveness to the 
public. Enforcement of the fairness doctrine would not occur at 
some random point, but rather, at the time when the damage 
was done and possibly still remediable.46 
In many ways, the Commission's standards, because inexact, 
were still difficult to apply.47 Concrete definitions of public in-
terest, controversy, and balance were not possible. The courts' 
traditional reluctance to pass judgment on subject matter added 
to the confusion.48 Because of this, the Commission was unpre-
pared to handle the "massive explosion" of fairness doctrine 
complaints that was ignited by the tumult of the late 1960's and 
early 1970's.49 The Commission responded by improving proce-
dures to provide petitioners more certainty in their claims. 
Among these procedures were new criteria for ascertaining con-
troversial issues of public importance.Go To allow members of the 
public to decide whether their claims against broadcasters had 
substance, the Commission decreed in 197 4 that programming 
logs should be made available to the public so that individuals 
could determine whether a broadcaster's radio and television 
programs had been unfair.G1 Like the changes brought about in 
The Primer, supra note 30, at 10,416. 
45. See id. 
46. 1974 Fairness Report, supra note 30, at 18; Barrow, The Equal Opportunities 
and Fairness Doctrine in Broadcasting, 37 U. C1N. L. REV. 447, 493-94 (1968). 
47. See generally Marks, Broadcasting and Censorship: First Amendment Theory 
After Red Lion, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV 974 (1970). 
48. 1974 Fairness Report, supra note 30, at 3 ("At first appearance, this affirmative 
use of government power to expand broadcast debate would seem to raise a striking 
paradox, for freedom of speech has traditionally implied absence of governmental super-
vision or control."); id. at 7 n.7 (comments of J. Skelly Wright); see CBS v. Democratic 
Nat') Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 120-21 (1973); Public Interest Research Group v. FCC, 522 
F.2d 1060, 1067 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 965 (1976). 
49 .. Democratic Nat'! Comm. v. FCC, 460 F.2d 913, 915 (D.C. Cir. 1972); B. COLE & 
M. OETTINGER, RELUCTANT REGULATORS v (1978); J. TUNSTALL, COMMUNICATIONS DEREGU-
LATION 29 (1986). 
50. Ascertainment of Community Problems, 27 F.C.C.2d 650 (1971). These ascertain-
ment procedures required broadcasters to survey thoroughly their community and its 
residents, meet with community leaders of all types, and decide what forms of program-
ming would best serve the interests of the community. Id. at 683-87. See generally J. 
TUNSTALL, supra note 49, at 247 (discussing the complexity of the ascertainment proce-
dures). Although not directly linked to the fairness doctrine, the ascertainment proce-
dures did allow broadcasters to consider possible community issues that could constitute 
controversial issues of public importance that would have to be covered under the fair-
ness doctrine. Deregulation of Radio, supra note 6, at 983 n.36. 
51. Petition for Rulemaking to Require Broadcast Licensee to Maintain Certain Pro-
gram Records, 44 F.C.C.2d 845 (1974). 
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the 1940's, the Commission reforms of the 1960's and 1970's in-
creased the responsiveness of the Commission to the public's in-
terest in fairness in broadcasting. 
Recognizing the great changes since its last assessment of the 
fairness doctrine in 1949,52 the Commission, in 197 4, launched a 
broad ranging inquiry into the success of the doctrine. The re-
sult was the 197 4 Fairness Report, 113 presenting a classic state-
ment of FCC policy on the fairness doctrine. The Report began 
with an invocation of section 315 of the Communications Act as 
a statutory codification of the fairness doctrine that prevented 
the Commission from abandoning the doctrine. 11• The Commis-
sion continued with a reassertion of the constitutionality of the 
doctrine on scarcity grounds and found the doctrine free from 
any chilling effect. 1111 By the time of its 1974 Report, the Com-
mission found the fairness doctrine recognized statutorily, justi-
fied constitutionally, and well supported on public policy 
grounds as a means to achieve robust debate over the broadcast 
airwaves. 116 
52. Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949). 
53. 1974 Fairness Report, supra note 30. 
54. "[I]n view of Sections 315(a) and 3(h) of the Communications Act, the Commis-
sion could not 'abandon the fairness doctrine or treat broadcasters as common carriers 
who must accept all material offered by any and all comers.'" Id. at 1 (quoting the 
Notice of Inquiry, 30 F.C.C.2d 26 (1971)). 
55. Id. at 6 ("We believe, however, that the problem of scarcity is still very much 
with us, and that despite recent advances in technology, there are still 'substantially 
more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate.'") (quot-
ing Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969)). 
Rejecting the chilling effect argument, the Commission emphasized the lack of overly 
burdensome procedures involved in the doctrine's enforcement, the Commission's reli-
ance on the good faith of the broadcaster, and the reasonableness of the doctrine's de-
mands on the broadcaster. The Commission seemed incredulous that such a simple rule 
could be perceived as frightening broadcasters into timid programming. Id. at 8. The 
Commission concluded with the Red Lion court that "we have seen no credible evidence 
that our policies have in fact had 'the net effect of reducing rather than enhancing the 
volume and quality of coverage.'" Id. In fact, the Commission concluded that "[f]ar from 
inhibiting debate, however, we believe that the doctrine has done much to expand and · 
enrich it .... [T)here is no doubt that 'it is a positive stimulus to broadcast journal-
ism.'" Id. at 7 (quoting W. Wooo, ELECTRONIC JOURNALISM 127 (1967)). 
56. The 1974 Fairness Report also discussed specific aspects of the fairness doctrine 
such as procedural definitions and standards, application of the fairness doctrine to ad-
vertising (Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968)), public access, and political 
broadcasts. 1974 Fairness Report, supra note 30, at 9-33. A subsequent report echoed the 
conclusions of the 1974 Fairness Report. The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fair-
ness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 74 
F.C.C.2d 163 (1979). 
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II. CONTEMPORARY FCC ENFORCEMENT OF THE FAIRNESS 
DOCTRINE 
Fairness doctrine enforcement in the 198O's departed starkly 
from previous enforcement. FCC changes in logging and ascer-
tainment procedures, used to enforce the fairness doctrine, 
demonstrated the deregulatory attitude of the Commission. The 
Commission's 1985 Fairness Report, however, expressed the 
most important difference in contemporary FCC interpretation 
of the doctrine. In the Report, for the first time, the Commission 
stated that the fairness doctrine undermined the public interest. 
This view rejected the fairness doctrine as law and has strongly 
influenced FCC case law. The philosophy of the 1985 Fairness 
Report finally was overtly adopted in 1987 when the Commis-
sion attempted to repeal the doctrine. 
A. Logging and Ascertainment Procedures 
The FCC directed its first deregulatory acts toward the radio 
industry. Beginning in 1981, the FCC no longer required radio 
broadcasters to follow public interest ascertainment proce-
dures.117 Nor would it continue to mandate that radio broadcast-
ers present public interest programming beyond that deemed 
necessary by the "good faith discretion" of the broadcaster.118 
The Commission also eliminated the logging requirements that 
allowed citizens to check the amount of time and coverage given 
to a public issue.119 The Commission replaced the logs with "pub-
lic inspection files" that, instead of providing a comprehensive 
57. Deregulation of Radio, supra note 6, at 971. 
58. Id. Without the guidelines, the FCC reasoned, public interest programming would 
be ensured by the good faith of the broadcaster motivated by "marketplace forces." Id. 
at 978. 
59. The FCC believed that because its deregulation had ended the FCC's need for 
the logs, the logs were unnecessary. In the same proceeding, the FCC abolished limita-
tions on the amount of air time given to advertising and entertainment programming. 
These were both regulations that relied on logging as the prime means to monitor station 
compliance. Id. at 968. The Commission denied that the logs presented evidence of com-
pliance with the fairness doctrine by pointing out that a satisfactory fairness doctrine 
complaint did not require the information within the logs: "The substance of a Fairness 
Doctrine complaint for example does not require complainants to present a comprehen-
sive list of all programming potentially relevant to each complaint, even though such a 
requirement might not have been unreasonable given the past public availability of the 
logs." Id. app. H, at 1113. The FCC also justified the elimination of the program logs by 
stating that the program logs were not necessarily the most effective way to monitor 
station compliance with the fairness doctrine. Id. 
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listing of all programs presented, would provide a list of five to 
ten of the important issues in the broadcaster's service area, ex-
amples of its public service programs aired over the past year 
that responded to public issues, and related information.60 Al-
though the Commission stated that it had no intent to apply the 
1981 ascertainment and logging deregulation to television, the 
Commission took similar deregulatory actions in that medium in 
1984.61 
The Commission appeared to recognize the inherent limits of 
its deregulatory actions in the broadcasting industry. Its aban-
donment of public interest and logging requirements "in no way 
[would] reduce our responsibility, ability and determination to 
provide a regulatory framework that assures radio broadcast 
programming in the public interest."62 The FCC assured the 
public that one other area of enforcement would also be pre-
served despite the wave of deregulation: "[M]any commentators 
feared that the Commission is proposing to eliminate the Fair-
ness Doctrine .... [The doctrine is] mandated by statute and, 
again, such statutory requirements cannot be modified by the 
Commission. They simply are not subject to deregulation by the 
Commission."63 This policy position was short-lived. 
B. The 1985 Fairness Report 
In 1985, the FCC radically departed from its previous position 
and found that the fairness doctrine failed to serve the public 
interest and violated the first amendment.64 The 1985 Fairness 
Report concluded: (1) that the fairness doctrine was an unneces-
sary means to ensure the diversity of opinion in the media mar-
ketplace; (2) that the fairness doctrine unconstitutionally chilled 
broadcast speech; and (3) that the Commission had been wrong 
to accept unquestioningly the 1959 amendments to the Commu-
60. Id. at 1010. 
61. "This proceeding does not contemplate the deregulation of TV in any regard and 
none of the actions taken herein apply to television." Id. at 974; see Revision of Pro-
gramming and Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment Requirements, and Program 
Log Requirements for Commercial Television Stations, 49 Fed. Reg. 33,588 (1984) (to be 
codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 0, 73); Revision of Program Policies and Reporting Require-
ments Related to Public Broadcasting Licensees, 49 Fed. Reg. 33,658 (1984) (to be codi-
fied at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73). See generally 48 Fed. Reg. 37,239 (1983) (notice of proposed 
rulemaking). 
62. Deregulation of Radio, supra note 6, at 1011 (1981). 
63. Id. at 974 (footnote omitted). 
64. 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 2, at 35,418. 
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nications Act as a statutory codification of the fairness doctrine. 
Because the 1985 Fairness Report provided the basis for the 
Commission's 1987 repeal of the doctrine, a closer inspection of 
the report provides insight into the reasoning behind the Com-
mission's abandonment of the fairness doctrine. 
1. Diversity in the media marketplace- The 1985 Fairness 
Report ostensibly addressed the state of the "information mar-
ketplace" to show that the fairness doctrine was an unnecessary 
means to a more diverse coverage of controversial issues. The 
Commission documented the massive increase in new technolo-
gies that created more diverse and competitive voices among the 
media and greatly increased access to and for the public.65 By 
showing that other media systems provided the public with bal-
anced viewpoints, the Commission attacked the public policy 
underlying the fairness doctrine.66 
This same argument, however, also undermines the constitu-
tional basis for the doctrine. The scarcity of the broadcast fre-
quency is the basis for the constitutionality of broadcast regula-
tion.67 Although the Commission referred obliquely to the 
constitutional impact of its findings on the media marketplace,68 
the Commission disingenuously disclaimed any intent to com-
ment on the validity of scarcity as a constitutional justification 
for continued enforcement of the fairness doctrine and broad-
cast regulation.69 Only rarely did the 1985 Fairness Report link 
its factual conclusion on the state of the media marketplace to 
65. Specifically, the Commission noted the emergence of cable television, low power 
television, multipoint distribution of broadcasts, various satellite technologies, videocas-
sette recorders, subscription television, and the expansion of frequencies for radio and 
television broadcasting (AM and FM radio frequencies, UHF and independent televi-
sion). Id. at 35,438-42. The Commission did not stop with the broadcast media, however, 
and pointed to the proliferation of newspapers and periodicals as alternative means of 
bringing controversial issues to the public. Id. at 35,443. 
66. "[I]ncreases in signal availability from traditional broadcasting facili-
ties-television and radio-by themselves attenuate the need for a government imposed 
obligation to provide coverage to controversial issues." Id. at 35,444. 
67. See Note, Expanding the Scarcity Rationale: The Constitutionality of Public 
Access Requirements in Cable Franchise Agreements, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 305, 324 
(1986); supra note 37. 
68. 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 2, at 35,420 (noting that the Red Lion Court 
based its constitutional decision on "the broadcasting marketplace as it existed more 
than sixteen years ago."); id. at 35,420-21 (pointing out dicta in FCC v. League of 
Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 378 n.12 (1985), indicating that the Court may be willing to 
reevaluate the scarcity rationale for broadcast regulation). 
69. 
We would agree that the courts may well be persuaded that the transformation 
in "the communications marketplace justifies the adoption of a standard that ac-
cords the same degree of constitutional protection to broadcast journalists as 
currently applies to journalists of other media. We do not believe, however, that 
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the argument attacking the constitutionality of the fairness 
doctrine. 70 
The danger in the Commission's argument on scarcity is not 
simply that its acceptance would weaken the constitutional basis 
for the fairness doctrine, but that the entire structure of broad-
cast regulation built upon that same basis would collapse as 
well. The scarcity rationale justifies not only the fairness doc-
trine, but all broadcast content regulation and much of the spe-
cial regulation that treats broadcasting differently from the print 
media. 71 The 1985 Fairness Report, then, constitutes more than 
an attack on the fairness doctrine; it is an assault on the very 
basis of broadcast regulation. 72 
But the Commission misplaced the emphasis in its discussion 
of scarcity. The special regulations applied to the broadcast me-
dia have been predicated on the public control of the airwaves. 
Broadcasters, then, are merely proxies or fiduciaries for the pub-
lic. 73 The FCC has traditionally considered scarcity to mean any 
it is necessary or appropriate for us to make that determination in this 
proceeding. 
Administrative agencies are not tasked with the duty to adjudicate the consti-
tutionality of a federal statute. 
Id. at 35,421. 
But see the proceedings abolishing the fairness doctrine where the Commission consid-
ered the 1985 Fairness Report to have invalidated the scarcity rationale. Fairness Held 
Unfair, BROADCASTING, Aug. 10, 1987, at 27, 31 (printing a transcript of the proceeding 
abolishing the fairness doctrine). 
70. See, e.g., 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 2, at 35,422 ("[W]hile we recognize 
that the United States Supreme Court found that the fairness doctrine was constitution-
ally permissible sixteen years ago, we believe that the transformation of the broadcast 
marketplace and the compelling documentation of the 'chilling effect' undermine the fac-
tual predicate of that decision."). The 1985 Fairness Report specifically notes that this 
change in the marketplace occurred after other reports and decisions upheld the doc-
trine's constitutionality. The Commission, thereby, prepared a rationale for distinguish-
ing those earlier conclusions. The 1974 Fairness Report justified the fairness doctrine, 
despite its infringement on the freedom of the press, on the scarcity of airspace for po-
tential broadcasters. The 1985 Fairness Report, on the other hand, found "the informa-
tion marketplace of today different from that which existed in 1974." Id. at 35,436. 
71. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 391 (1969) ("[l]n 
terms of constitutional principle, and as enforced sharing of a scarce resource, the per-
sonal attack and political editorial rules [components of the fairness doctrine] are indis-
tinguishable from the equal-time provision of § 315 ... to which the fairness doctrine 
and these constituent regulations are important complements."). Licensing regulations, 
for instance, are one aspect of the special set of rules applied solely to the broadcast 
media. 
72. See 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 2, at 35,454 ("Today's report is an indict-
ment of a misguided government policy .... Today's order is a statement by this Com-
mission that we should reverse course, and head ballistically toward liberty of the press 
for radio and television.") (statement of FCC Chairman Mark Fowler). 
73. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389; 1974 Fairness Report, supra note 30, at 4 n.4: "The 
true measure of scarcity is in terms of the number of persons who wish to broadcast and, 
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situation where demand for broadcast frequencies outstrips sup-
ply. 74 The role of the government is justified not by numerically 
few broadcast outlets, but rather, by many members of the pub-
lic who wish to use those outlets. Put simply, the scarcity justifi-
cation applies when "there are substantially more individuals 
who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate."711 
If the scarcity of positions on the broadcast spectrum requires 
the FCC to choose between applicants rather than giving all who 
apply licenses, this scarcity justifies a special constitutional 
place for broadcast regulation. 76 According to this test, despite 
the recent increase in media outlets, broadcast scarcity remains 
a very real factor. 77 
2. Chilling effect- Central to the Commission's doubts 
about the constitutionality of the fairness doctrine was the doc-
trine's chilling effect, repressing coverage of controversial is-
sues.78 The Commission premised its argument on a reiteration 
of the Red Lion Court's warning that any fairness doctrine-in-
duced chilling effect on the first amendment rights of broadcast-
in Justice White's language, there are still 'substantially more individuals who want to 
broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate.'" (citing Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388). 
74. As early as 1925, the Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover, whose department 
was then charged with broadcast regulation, justified regulation by stating, "We can no 
longer deal on the basis that there is room for everybody on the radio highways. There 
are more vehicles on the road then can get by, and if they continue to jam in all will be 
stopped." FOURTH NAT'L RADIO CONFERENCE: PROCEEDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
REGULATION OF RADIO 6 (1925). 
75. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388. Former FCC Commissioner Newton Minow agreed, 
suggesting, "The proper test is the number of citizens who want a broadcast license and 
are unable to obtain one." Minow, Being Fair to the Fairness Doctrine, N.Y. Times, 
Aug. 27, 1985, at A23, col. l; see also S. REP. No. 34, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1987); 
H.R. REP. No. 108, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1987). 
76. Red Licin Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 397 (1969). Comparative hear-
ings for broadcast frequencies remain a mainstay of the Commission's docket. See 
Marks, supra note 47; infra note 77. 
77. Minow, supra note 75. Minow points to the fact that when RKO's channels were 
made available for licensees, the FCC received 172 applications for the several stations. 
When the FCC announced new low power stations, the Commission was inundated with 
almost 14,000 applications. This supply versus demand approach appears to have been 
the traditional measure of scarcity. See Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 FED. RADIO 
COMM'N ANN. REP. 32, 33 ("[T]here is no way of increasing the number of stations with-
out great injury to the listening public, and yet thousands of stations might be necessary 
to accommodate all the individuals who insist on airing their views through the 
microphone."). But see the FCC claim in the 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 2, at 
35,439: "Currently there are a total of 54 vacant VHF channels and 462 vacant UHF 
channels. [O]f these vacant allocations, 34 are commercial VHF channels and 109 com-
mercial UHF channels. These vacancies appear in both large and small markets." (foot-
notes omitted). 
78. See 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 2, at 35,423-24. 
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ers would outweigh the state's justification for the regulation. On 
that basis, the Commission found that the fairness doctrine 
chilled free expression and violated the first amendment.79 It 
noted that fear of enforcement actions, litigation costs in de-
f ending against fairness doctrine actions, and possibly negative 
public reaction to a suit caused broadcasters to avoid airing con-
troversial issues.80 That fairness doctrine violations were rarely 
found and that enforcement action was infrequently severe was 
considered irrelevant. The important fact, the Commission ar-
gued, was that broadcasters somehow perceived these penalties 
as being imminent if they broadcast controversial issues.81 These 
factors, taken together, motivated broadcasters to impose self-
censorship and to schedule significantly less controversial issues 
programming. 
The evidence relied upon by the Commission as empirical 
proof of a chilling effect is sharply deficient on several grounds. 
The Commission found this chilling effect through evidence sub-
mitted by interested individuals and groups,82 and particularly 
relied on the statements of individual broadcasters and the Na-
tional Association of Broadcasters.83 This evidence does not 
79. The Commission found the roots of this chilling effect in the inequality of the two 
prongs of the fairness doctrine. Id. at 35,423-24. Because the first prong, requiring the 
coverage of controversial issues, was rarely enforced and the second prong, requiring bal-
anced treatment of any controversial issues, was more often enforced, broadcasters could 
evade the doctrine by not presenting controversial issues programming at all. In this 
way, broadcasters avoided the balance requirement by quietly ignoring the dormant first 
prong. Id. 
80. Id. at 35,423-26. In enforcing the fairness doctrine, the Commission is able to 
deny license renewal for violations of the doctrine, thereby ending the licensee's 
broadcasts. 
81. Id. at 35,424 n.75. 
82. Proof for these assertions was presented in the form of individual accounts, ex-
amples, and surveys submitted in response to the FCC's Notice of Inquiry, 49 Fed. Reg. 
20,317 (1984), and the subsequent hearings. 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 2, at 
35,418. The broadcasters' self-interest in being freed of the constraints of the regulation 
makes the evidence extremely biased. See generally id. at 35,430. The Commission re-
sponded that, in fact, the opposite was true. These admissions actually go against the 
interests of the broadcaster because the admissions expose the broadcaster to charges of 
unprofessional journalism and prosecution under the first prong of the fairness doctrine 
itself. Id. 
83. Id. at 35,418. The National Association of Broadcasters documented 45 examples 
of a chilling effect induced by the fairness doctrine. Many of these examples had been 
previously presented to congressional committees considering repeal of the doctrine and 
had proven unpersuasive. S. REP. No. 34, supra note 75, at 29 (1987) (citing Media Ac-
cess Project Reply Comments). The Senate concluded that the examples, as offered by 
Chairman Fowler, "grossly distorted" the Report's portrayal of the fairness doctrine at 
work. Id. at 28. 
0 
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withstand scrutiny. 84 Many of the statements are anonymous 
and anecdotal. 85 Some present nothing more than complaints 
about the nature of the justice system rather than complaints 
unique to the fairness doctrine.88 Finally, some of the incidents 
cited by the FCC as examples of a chilling effect prove, instead, 
the success of the fairness doctrine in assuring balanced and un-
biased broadcasting. The examples cited to show a quashing of 
"diverse" programming also show broadcasters deciding not to 
present unfair programs to the public.87 
Most importantly, the FCC's report reveals a basic reinterpre-
tation of the purpose of the fairness doctrine. The Commission 
now believes that the goal of the doctrine is simply to preserve 
"controversial speech." The traditional view of the doctrine, 
however, places a higher value on the fairness of the broadcast, 
on its balance rather than its controversy.88 By misconstruing. 
the purpose of the fairness doctrine, the Commission empha-
sized the effect of the doctrine on the presence of extremes of 
84. Ferris & Kirkland, Fairness-the Broadcaster's Hippocratic Oath, 34 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 605, 615 & n.69 (1985): 
[I]n 1984, the National Association of Broadcasters, presumably after an exhaus-
tive search, could produce only a few instances of a supposed chilling effect. . . . 
The NAB claimed to have documented 45 examples of a "chilling effect." ... 
Even if all of these examples were valid, considering that the examples covered a 
16 year period, and that there are approximately 10,000 broadcast licensees, this 
record hardly would be compelling. Even these few examples, however, have 
been extensively criticized. 
85. S. REP. No. 34, supra note 75, at 30 ("[N]o detailed and well documented evi-
dence- [is] presented, only isolated anecdotes."); see, e.g., 1985 Fairness Report, supra 
note 2, at 35,427 n.101,: "At least one broadcaster, however, has candidly admitted that 
'his news staff avoids controversial issues as a matter of routine because of the Fairness 
Doctrine.'" Similarly: "Ms. Karen Maas, Vice President and General Manager of KIUP-
AM and KRSJ-FM, in Durango, Colorado states that her stations 'think[] twice' about 
covering state ballot and related political issues." Id. at 35,428. 
Ironically, the Commission dismissed the anecdotal evidence offered in submissions 
favoring the fairness doctrine by stating, "[W]e do not believe that the isolated represen-
tations of some broadcasters to the effect that the doctrine does not have any effect on 
the type, frequency or duration of the controversial viewpoints they air are probative of 
an absence of chilling effect within the industry as a whole." Id. at 35,431. 
86. Examples include a radio station general manager who complained, " 'The simple 
fact ~hat they accused us of violating this rule created the impression that we were wrong 
in undertaking the issue, even if that wasn't the case. Often the accused party suffers, 
whether right or wrong, only because they have been accused.'" Id. at 35,426. 
87. S. REP. No. 34, supra note 75, at 28. See, for example, the decision by a Pennsyl-
vania station not to air a series on B'nai B'rith, 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 2, at 
35,428, and stations' decisions not to broadcast various corporate advertisements on po-
litical issues. Id. at 35,428-29. 
88. The FCC's error becomes clear when it offers radio station WXUR (Brandywine-
Main Line Radio, Inc.), a station with programming so controversial and unbalanced it 
offended most listeners, as the paradigm of controversial broadcasting and hence, the 
fairness doctrine. See infra text accompanying notes 98-99 . 
• 
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controversy rather than on the balanced presentation of issues 
demanded by the public interest. 
3. Codification- The Commission's report repudiated its 
previous stance that the fairness doctrine was a mandate solidly 
codified by Congress in the 1959 amendments to the Communi-
cations Act. Because of the findings on the doctrine's detrimen-
tal impact on broadcast freedom, the Commission now believed 
that the fairness doctrine did not inhere in the public interest 
standard. The 1959 amendments, on the other hand, were 
neither accepted nor rejected by the Commission as a codifica-
tion of the fairness doctrine. Emphasizing the ambiguities in the 
legislative history, the Commission concluded that no evidence 
demonstrated any intent by Congress to codify the doctrine. Red 
Lion was also read with an emphasis on the ambiguities present 
in that decision.89 After deemphasizing two decades of Commis-
sion interpretation and giving special emphasis to a House Staff 
Report that concluded that the doctrine was not codified in 
1959,90 the Commission decided that the uncertainty was too 
great for the Commission to repeal the doctrine on its own, at 
least at that moment.91 The Commission did, however, invite 
Congress to clear up the uncertainty by legislative action to re-
peal the fairness doctrine.92 By reaching the conclusion that the 
fairness doctrine held a doubtful statutory position, the Com-
mission began to lay the basis for formally deregulating the doc-
trine without Congressional involvement. 
The 1985 Report offers no explanation for the Commission's 
policy change from the 197 4 Report. Only the scarcity section is 
based on a shift in the status of the marketplace from the time 
of the Commission's earlier conclusions. The other changes in 
policy and interpretation cannot· be based on changed facts or 
89. 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 2, at 35,451. 
90. Id. at 35,452 (citing the MANELLI REPORT, supra note 29). 
91. The Report's conclusion read, "[I]t would be inappropriate at this time to elimi-
nate the fairness doctrine." 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 2, at 35,453. 
92. Id. Commissioner Quello concurred with the Commission's opinion, but ques-
tioned the 1985 Fairness Report's conclusions regarding codification: 
[T]his record compels the conclusion that Congress intended to codify the fair-
ness doctrine as part of the 1959 amendments to the Communications Act. The 
Commission has long acquiesced in the view that the fairness doctrine was codi-
fied by these amendments, and, thus, the burden of proof must rest with those 
who would urge that the agency itself has authority to eliminate the doctrine. In 
my view, nothing in the record contradicts the clear language of section 315(a). 
Id. at 35,454-55 (footnote omitted). 
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situations93 but, rather, on a changed political viewpoint-one 
supporting deregulation. 
C. Contemporary FCC Case Law 
An examination of Commission decisions in the area reveals 
that the Commission significantly curtailed enforcement of the 
fairness doctrine before it formally repealed the doctrine. From 
1982 to 1986, the FCC reported twenty-four fairness doctrine 
cases on appeal94 and decided against the broadcaster only 
93. Indeed, much of the evidence for the chilling effect conclusions of the 1985 Re-
port was identical to evidence presented to and rejected by the Commission in previous 
considerations of the fairness doctrine. SEN. REP. No. 34, supra note 75, at 30. 
94. The Commission hears appeals from the initial decisions of the Mass Media Bu-
reau (formerly the Broadcast Bureau). 
The following cases were reported during that period: Central Intelligence Agency, 58 
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1544 (1985) (denying petitioner's fairness doctrine action by find-
ing that the issue of CIA involvement in unlawful activity was not a controversial issue 
of public importance); Cattle Country Broadcasting Hearing Designation Order and No-
tice of Apparent Liability, 50 Fed. Reg. 7,272 (1985) [hereinafter Cattle Country] (dis-
cussed infra notes 100-05 and accompanying text); Syracuse Peace Council, 99 F.C.C.2d 
1389 (1984), rev'd sub nom. Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1987), on 
remand, Syracuse Peace Council, 63 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 541 (1987) (striking down the 
fairness doctrine as unconstitutional), appeal docketed, No. 87-1516 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 14, 
1987) (discussed infra notes 121-25, 144-50, and accompanying text); RKO Gen., Inc. 
(WHBQ-TV), 49 Fed. Reg. 47,562 (1984) (denying a fairness doctrine complaint on the 
grounds that petitioners did not isolate a specific issue ignored by the broadcaster, did 
not prove that this issue was controversial, and did not prove that the broadcaster did 
not present sufficient programming on issues controversial in the black community); Yes 
to Stop Callaway Comm., 98 F.C.C.2d 1317 (1984) (denying petitioner's request for re-
view of Bureau decision dismissing complaint because the petitioner did not demonstrate 
nuclear power plant construction in the community was a controversial issue of public 
importance) (see infra notes 107-08 and accompanying text); United Church of Christ, 
97 F.C.C.2d 433 (1984) (holding that a broadcaster's charge that a church was doing the 
work of international communism did not constitute a controver,;;ial issue); Brent Buell, 
97 F.C.C.2d 55 (1984) (denying review of Bureau decision because petitioner did not 
notify broadcaster of complaint and on procedural grounds); Ulster-American Heritage 
Found., 96 F.C.C.2d 1246 (1984) (denying reconsideration of a Bureau dismissal on 
grounds that Irish terrorist acts are not controversial issues of public importance in this 
country); Pacifica Found., 95 F.C.C.2d 750 (1983) (denying petitioner's request for review 
of dismissal for non-notification of broadcaster, lack of information on the broadcaster's 
total response to the controversial issue, and poor definition of that issue); CBS, Inc., 95 
F.C.C.2d 1152, 1165 (1983) (confining special treatment of political advertisements to 
election periods); Florida Power & Light Co., 95 F.C.C.2d 605 (1983) (dismissing com-
plaint requesting review of Bureau decision because broadcaster offered complainant 
time to respond to allegedly unfair broadcasts); Conservative Caucus, 94 F.C.C.2d 728 
(denying review due to failure to adequately identify controversial issue of public impor-
tance) (1984); Accuracy in Media, 94 F.C.C.2d 501 (1984) (appeal from Mass Media Bu-
reau dismissed due to untimely filing); Joint Council of Allergy & Immunology, 94 
F.C.C.2d 734 (1984) (denying review based on failure to adequately identify controversial 
issue of public importance); American Sec. Council, 94 F.C.C.2d 521 (1984) (appeal by 
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once. 9~ In comparison, in 1980 alone, the Commission heard 
twenty-eight cases and found against the broadcasters in six of 
them. 96 This drastic decline can only be explained by a change 
in the Commission's enforcement of the doctrine.97 
public interest group dismissed on issue of contrasting viewpoints); Eulogio Cardona y 
Beltran, 94 F.C.C.2d 146 (1984) (rejecting application for review of decision on peti-
tioner's personal attack charge); Henry W. Maier, 93 F.C.C.2d 132 (1983) (rejecting per-
sonal attack petition because the broadcast.er had provided rebuttal time to petitioner); 
Brother Rama Behera & Disciples of the Lord Jesus, 93 F.C.C.2d 7, 12 (1983) (rejecting . 
application for reconsideration due to lack of new or additional information); United 
Broadcasting Co., 93 F.C.C.2d 482 (1983) (rejecting fairness doctrine claim against 
United on basis that no controversial issue of public importance had been isolated); 
Northern Television, 91 F.C.C.2d 305, 320 (1982) (finding broadcaster acted in good faith 
in presenting sufficient opposing viewpoint); Environmental Defense Fund, 90 F.C.C.2d 
648 (1982) (dismissing petition for failure to define controversial issues of public impor-
tance and for insufficient proof of balance) (see infra notes 111-14 and accompanying 
text); George Miller, 90 F.C.C.2d 524 (1982) (denying reconsideration of personal attack 
case); Friendly Broadcasting Co., 90 F.C.C.2d 225 (1982) (dismissing case after death of 
licensee's principal); Democratic Nat'! Comm., 91 F.C.C.2d 373 (1982) (dismissing peti-
tion due to lack of proof that broadcasters did not offer opposing viewpoints in overall 
programming). 
95. Syracuse Peace Council, 99 F.C.C.2d 1389 (1984) (finding a violation by the pres-
entation of only one side of a controversy surrounding the economic soundness of nuclear 
power), rev'd sub nom. Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1987), on re-
mand, Syracuse Peace Council, 63 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 541 (1987) (striking down the 
fairness doctrine as unconstitutional), appeal docketed, No. 87-1516 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 14, 
1987). 
96. F. RowAN, supra note 19, at 51 
97. There was little decline in overall fairness doctrine complaints. Federal Commu-
nications Comm'n, FCC Total Complaints and Inquiries, 1970-1986 (unpublished, un-
dated table of figures) (copy on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.). The high number of com-
plaints in 1980 and 1984 is due to the number of § 315 political candidate complaints 
filed during those election years. 
Total Complaints and Inquiries 
Fiscal Year Fairness Doctrine § 315 Total 
1977 3,692 2,329 6,021 
1978 3,857 4,487 8,344 
1979 4,490 4,365 8,855 
1980 9,897 10,443 20,340 
1981 5,932 4,800 10,732 
1982 • • •• 
1983 • • • 
1984 6,760 11,698 18,458 
1985 7,296 1,348 8,624 
1986 • • 8,215 
• - Not available. 
•• - Fiscal year 1982 figures are unavailable. Calendar year 1982 total fairness com-
plaints and inquiries: 10,358. 
These statistics do not necessarily represent formal actionable fairness doctrine com-
plaints. The FCC figures do not distinguish between complaints and inquiries. Eighty to 
ninety percent of the complaints and inquiries represent phone calls and not formal let-
ters of complaint. Those that are formal written charges go through a process of win-
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The change in the FCC's level of enforcement of the fairness 
doctrine is also evident in the adjudication of individual cases. 
The Commission restricted enforcement by increasing the bur-
den on fairness doctrine petitioners in several significant ways. 
A comparison of two cases with similar facts provides a strik-
ing example of the Commission's manipulation of fairness doc-
trine standards. The FCC inflicted the strongest penalty yet im-
posed for a fairness doctrine violation, a denial of license 
renewal, in the 1970 case of Brandywine-Main Line Radio.98 
There, a station owned by a fundamentalist seminary in the 
small town of Media, Pennsylvania, broadcast a continuous 
stream of right-wing programming. Reviewing the Commission~s 
handling of the case, the court held, "Brandywine's record is in-
dicative of a lack of regard for fairness principles; at worst, it 
shows an utter disdain for Commission rulings. . . . This record 
is replete with example after example of one-sided presentation 
of issues of controversial importance to the public."99 In a very 
similar 1984 case, the citizens of Dodge City, Kansas, lodged a 
fairness doctrine complaint against the broadcasters of Cattle 
Country Broadcasting (KTTL Radio) at the station's license re-
newal time.100 The community based its complaint on a series of 
programs presenting the views of right-wing fundamentalist 
ministers. 101 Despite the obvious lack of balanced programming 
on clearly controversial issues and the similarity of the case to 
Brandywine, the Commission granted the renewal petition and 
refused to prosecute the fairness doctrine challenge. In short, 
the situation in Brandywine, like Cattle Country, is exactly 
when enforcement of the fairness doctrine is traditionally most 
appropriate.102 
Although the facts of Brandywine are almost indistinguish-
able from those of Cattle Country, 103 Brandywine is not men-
nowing that drastically reduces the number of actual complaints acted upon by the Com-
mission. F. ROWAN, supra note 19, at 52-53. 
98. 24 F.C.C.2d 18 (1970), rev'g 24 F.C.C.2d 42, alf'd, 473 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
99. Brandywine-Main Line Radio, 473 F.2d at 47. 
100. Cattle Country Broadcasting, 50 Fed. Reg. 37,272 (1985). 
101. KTTL broadcasters aired 264 hours of this series attacking Catholics, Jews, 
blacks, other minorities, and government officials. For example: " 'If a Jew comes near 
you run a sword through him ... Blacks and Brown are the enemy. Jesus Christ is a 
white man's God ... Your citizen's posse will hang [a public official] by the neck and 
take the body down at dark ... .'" Minow, supra note 75, at A23, col. 1. Approximately 
10 minutes of air time were given to opposing viewpoints. Id. 
102. Krattenmaker & Powe, The Fairness Doctrine Today: A Constitutional Curios-
ity and an Impossible Dream, 1985 DUKE L.J. 151, 175. 
103. The only difference may be that the Brandywine-Main Line station aroused 
more controversy at the time of its broadcasts. Resolutions were passed in the Pennsyl-
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tioned in Cattle Country. The petitioner's complaint fails due to 
a higher standard imposed on the petitioner by the FCC.10• In 
Cattle Country, the Commission found that the petitioners 
failed to meet several of the newly restrictive criteria. 1011 Hence, 
the Commission did not even move to consider the sixth require-
ment, that of balance. 
Other, less dramatic, cases show the increasingly demanding 
requirements imposed on petitioners seeking to bring an action 
against broadcasters. The "controversial issue of public impor-
tance" requirement is one that has been significantly restricted 
in recent adjudications. In 1973, a public interest group chal-
lenged a broadcaster who had presented only those advertise-
ments favoring a rate increase by a local power company. The 
Commission found that it was unreasonable for a broadcaster to 
conclude that the rate increase was not a controversial issue of 
vania legislature and in the Media, Pennsylvania, town council condemning the broad-
casts. The Commission found that this was one indicia of controversy missing from Cat-
tle Country. 
Specifically, a controversiality showing should include information concerning 
the degree of attention paid to an issue by government officials, community lead-
ers, and the media at the time the subject material was broadcast; any contro-
versy and opposition of a substantial nature concerning programs broadcast by a 
licensee (even where such "controversy and opposition" arises subsequent to the 
broadcast of the programming in question). 
Cattle Country, 50 Fed. Reg. at 37,275 n.10. 
Yet, Cattle Country was surrounded by national controversy of its own. The Commis-
sion itself recognized this controversy: 
We consider this case against a background of unusually widespread publicity 
and political interest; the case has been the subject of many national and local 
news accounts, and, in fact, Mrs. Babbs was called to testify on the matter 
before the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications .... We have been 
very conscious of the need to maintain impartiality against this highly charged 
background. 
Id. at 37,272. 
104. The petitioner did not adequately satisfy the criteria for a prima facie case. The 
criteria are: 
(1) Identify the issues broadcast with specificity; (2) demonstrate by objectively 
quantifiable information that the issues were controversial; (3) demonstrate that 
the issues identified were of public importance; (4) demonstrate that the broad-
casts addressed the issues identified by the petitioners; (5) demonstrate that the 
programs meaningfully discussed the identified issues of public importance; and 
(6) demonstrate that in its overall programming the licensee failed to present 
contrasting viewpoints sufficient to meet its fairness obligations. 
Id. at 37,275. 
105. The petitioners did not adequately show that the issues discussed on 
KTTL-race, economic distress, and criminal justice-were "the subject of vigorous de-
bate with substantial elements of the community in opposition to one another" and were 
likely to have an impact on the community at large. Id. (quoting the 1974 Fairness Re-
port, supra note 30). Petitioners also failed to show that the "incoherent monologues 
interspersed with occasional tirades ... and fleeting offensive remarks" were part of a 
"meaningful discussion." Id. at 37,277. 
824 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 20:3 
public importance when public hearings were being held on the 
issue and many community groups opposed the increase.106 The 
Commission required the broadcaster to remedy the situation by 
presenting opposing viewpoints. 
This precedent carried little weight in 1984, however, when a 
similar case was heard. 107 The petitioner challenged a broad-
caster who presented a series of electric company advertisements 
favoring the need for a nuclear power plant in the community. 
The petitioner pointed to public hearings on the matter of con-
struction, newspaper articles and editorials discussing the mat-
ter, and statements of public interest groups both opposing and 
supporting the electric company. Nevertheless, the Commission 
sided with the broadcaster and decided that the need for a nu-
clear power plant was not a controversial issue in the commu-
nity.108 By restrictively applying the controversial issues stan-
dard, the Commission has removed previously actionable claims 
from its consideration. 
The Commission has also restricted complaints by strictly 
construing its requirement that petitioners present their com-
plaint to the broadcaster and obtain a response before going to 
the Commission.109 Although the requirement of notice to the 
broadcaster has long been a part of Commission fairness doc-
trine adjudication, petitioners who choose not to wait for a 
broadcaster's response to that notice now face the strong 
probability that their claims will be dismissed by the Mass Me-
dia Bureau and, on appeal, by the Commission.110 Most mem-
bers of the public are unable on their own, through complaints 
to the broadcaster, to enforce the fairness doctrine. As such, this 
requirement does not encourage settlement of petitions outside 
of FCC proceedings. Instead, it delays a petitioner's claim until 
the broadcaster responds. 
Additionally, the Commission has mandated that a petitioner 
must specify his viewing of the broadcaster with particularity to 
ensure that the broadcaster presented imbalanced program-
106. Media Access Project, 44 F.C.C.2d 755, 760-61 (1973), aff'd sub nom. Georgia 
Power Project v. FCC, 559 F.2d 237 (5th Cir. 1977). 
107. Yes to Stop Callaway Comm., 98 F.C.C.2d 1317 (1984). 
108. Id. at 1322-27. 
109. See American Sec. Council Educ. Found. v. FCC, 607 F.2d 438, 445 (D.C. Cir. 
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980); and the 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 2, at 
35,431 n.150 for the dimension of the notice requirement. 
110. See, e.g., Pacifica Found., 95 F.C.C.2d 750 (1983). Appartently, notice to the 
broadcaster had been sufficient to satisfy the Commission's requirement if the broad-
caster did not make a good faith response. 
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ming. m One of several methods of proof required the petitioner 
to be a "regular viewer" who could say from experience that the 
broadcaster's overall programming was unfair.112 The Commis-
sion, however, began to require the petitioner to document his 
viewing in detail, ignoring other, previously acceptable, evidence 
of broadcaster unfairness offered by the petitioner.113 By re-
stricting this requirement, the Commission imposed upon peti-
tioners the type of unduly burdensome requirement that the 
Commission had previously sought to avoid when it announced 
the criteria. 114 
These criteria, suddenly stringently applied, were one method 
used by the Commission to restrict the success of those petition-· 
ing against fairness doctrine violations. Through such decisions 
and through its initial review of petitions, the Commission, it-
self, long before it actually repealed the doctrine in 1987, limited 
the application of the doctrine without congressional approval or 
empowerment. 
D. Repeal of the Fairness Doctrine 
A number of factors coincided to allow the FCC to repeal the 
fairness doctrine. Court action, congressional failure, and FCC 
activism each provided a necessary prerequisite to the demise of 
the doctrine. · 
1. The courts- The 1985 Fairness Report was presaged by 
an indication that the Supreme Court might welcome the Com-
111. H.R. REP. No. 108, supra note 75, at 25 ("[M]ore recently, it appears that the 
Commission has been applying this policy in a way that holds complainants to an in-
creasingly higher, and unfair burden as to their awareness of a broadcaster's program-
ming."); see, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, 90 F.C.C.2d 648, 658 (1982). 
112. John Howard, 55 F.C.C.2d 777, 780 (1975); 1974 Fairness Report, supra note 30, 
at 19 ("While the complainant must state the basis for this claim that the station has not 
presented contrasting views, that claim might be based° on an assertion that the com-
plainant is a regular listener or viewer .... ") (emphasis added). 
113. In Environmental Defense Fund, 90 F.C.C.2d at 658, the Commission rejected 
the petitioner's charge of broadcaster unfairness because the petitioner did not docu-
ment with particularity the petitioner's viewing habits. Yet, the petitioner had docu-
mented its charge of unfairness through other evidentiary bases, the broadcaster's pro-
gram logs, and had assembled a "detailed and comprehensive analysis of station 
programming." Id. at 653, 658. The Commission also ignored its previous position that it 
assumed that a petitioner was a "regular viewer" and that the claim against a broad-
caster was well founded if a group of viewers, rather than an individual one, petitioned 
against the broadcaster. See 1974 Fairness Report, supra note 30, at 19. The Environ-
mental Defense Fund case involved just such a group of individuals. Environmental De-
fense Fund, 90 F.C.C.2d at 649 n.2. 
114. 1974 Fairness Report, supra note 30, at 19. 
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mission's conclusions. The Court noted, in dictum, that any 
Commission evidence of a chilling effect would force it to recon-
sider the constitutional basis of the fairness doctrine. 116 The 
Court also suggested that it might be willing to reconsider the 
scarcity justification for broadcast regulation if the FCC was to 
determine that technological change had invalidated that consti-
tutional justification.116 By announcing these thoughts on the 
fairness doctrine, the Supreme Court implied that it would be 
ready to take up the issues of the 1985 Fairness Report and pass 
judgment on the fate of the fairness doctrine. 
Prompted perhaps by the Supreme Court's apparent willing-
ness to review the doctrine, Telecommunications Research & 
Action Center u. FCC117 (TRAC) provided the necessary basis 
for eventual FCC repeal. In TRAC, a public interest group chal-
lenged an FCC decision not to apply certain content regulations 
such as the fairness doctrine to the new technology of teletext. 118 
A District of Columbia Circuit panel, in an opinion by Judge 
Bork, joined by then-Judge Scalia, upheld the Commission's 
freedom to apply the fairness doctrine to whichever broadcast 
media it wished. The court noted, "We do not believe that lan-
guage adopted in 1959 made the fairness doctrine a binding stat-
utory obligation; rather, it ratified the Commission's longstand-
ing position that the public interest standard authorizes the 
fairness doctrine."119 The court then read the Red Lion decision 
115. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 378-79 n.12 (1984): 
We note that the FCC, observing that "[i]f any substantial possibility exists that 
the [fairness doctrine] rules have impeded, rather than furthered, First Amend-
ment objectives, repeal may be warranted on that ground alone," has tentatively 
concluded that the rules, by effectively chilling speech, do not serve the public 
interest, and has therefore proposed to repeal them. . . . As we recognized in 
Red Lion, however, were it to be shown by the Commission that the fairness 
doctrine "[has] the net effect of reducing rather than enhancing" speech, we 
would then be forced to reconsider the constitutional basis of our decision in 
that case. 
See Branch v. FCC, 824 F.2d 37, 50 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that the 1985 Fairness 
Report may signal the Court that the fairness doctrine is constitutionally suspect). 
116. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 377 n.11 ("We are not prepared, however, 
to reconsider our longstanding approach without some signal from Congress or the FCC 
that technological developments have advanced so far that some revision of the system 
of broadcast regulation may be required."). 
117. 801 F.2d 501, 508-09 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3196 (1987). 
118. The case involved two other political content rules, § 312(a)(7), requiring rea-
sonable access to broadcasting stations for a candidate for federal office, and § 315, the 
equal opportunity rule for political candidates. See supra note 2. 
Teletext is a broadcasting service that transmits textual and graphic material to the 
television screens of home viewers. TRAC, 801 F.2d at 502-03. 
119. TRAC, 801 F.2d at 517. The TRAC court's approach was short and purely statu-
tory. The court did not look to legislative intent. Judge Bork continued, 
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in concordance with its interpretation of the 1959 amendments. 
TRAC, then, allows the Commission to change its enforcement 
of the fairness doctrine provided that it justifies its actions in 
accord with administrative law.120 
What TRAC allowed, Meredith Corp. v. FCC121 demanded. In 
Meredith, the only .broadcaster who was found in violation of 
the fairness doctrine since 1982 challenged the constitutionality 
of the fairness doctrine on first amendment grounds. 122 The 
Commission, relying on the codification conclusions in its 1985 
Fairness Report, refused to reconsider the constitutionality of 
the doctrine, def erring to the decisions of Congress and the 
courts on the matter.123 The District of Columbia Circuit found 
the Commission's avoidance of the constitutional issue "the very 
paradigm of arbitrary and capricious administrative action" and 
remanded the case to the FCC. 124 The FCC now had the oppor-
tunity to conclude a seven-year weakening of the doctrine with 
its final abolition. 1211 
Id. 
The language, by its plain import, neither creates nor imposes any obligation, 
but seeks to make it clear that the statutory amendment does not affect the 
fairness doctrine obligation as the Commission had previously applied it. The 
words employed by Congress also demonstrate that the obligation recognized 
and preserved was an administrative construction, not a binding statutory 
directive. 
The petition for rehearing on the issue of codification was denied by a divided court. 
This division is highlighted by the dueling opinions of Judges Mikva and Bork on the 
statutory status of the fairness doctrine. Telecommunications Research & Action Center 
v. FCC, 806 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1115 (1987). 
120. TRAC, 801 F.2d at 518. The court also considered the Commission's argument 
that, due to teletext's similarity to printing, the new medium should be regulated as if it 
were a print and not a broadcasting medium. The TRAC court rejected the Commis-
sion's definition of scarcity as applying only to those broadcast media that had the "im-
mediacy" of traditional broadcasting. Id. at 508. Although the court attacked the wisdom 
of the scarcity justification, the court resigned itself to following the Supreme Court po-
sition upholding the scarcity basis for the fairness doctrine stating, "neither we nor the 
Commission are free to seek new rationales to remedy the inadequacy of the doctrine in 
this area." Id. at 509. 
121. 809 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Meredith involved a challenge by the Syracuse 
Peace Council to a broadcaster's imbalanced presentation of interest group advertising in 
support of nuclear power plant development. 
122. Id. at 865. 
123. Id. at 868. 
124. Id. at 874. 
125. Surprisingly, the Commission was not enthusiastic about this prospect. The 
Commission actually objected to the Meredith court's hearing of the case on grounds of 
timeliness and standing of the petitioner. Id. at 868, 869. At the same time, before the 
same court, however, the Commission was advancing the standing of the Radio-Televi-
sion News Directors Association to challenge the doctrine on the same grounds. Radio-
Television News Directors Ass'n (RTNDA) v. FCC, 809 F.2d 860 (D.C. Cir.) (rejecting 
the Commission's position on standing), vacated, 831 F.2d 1148 (1987). The irony of the 
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2. Legislative Response to FCC Action- The congressional 
response may provide a basis for a new congressional man-
date.126 In late 1986, faced with the challenge of the FCC's 1985 
Fairness Report and the D.C. Circuit's TRAC decision, Congress 
acted to protect the doctrine by passing an amendment preserv-
ing it.127 
On its face, the new legislation says very little. The Act reads 
simply, "[F]unds appropriated to the Federal Communications 
Commission by this Act shall be used to consider alternative 
means of administration and enforcement of the Fairness Doc-
trine and to report to the Congress by September 30, 1987."128 
Yet, several important conclusions may be drawn from the 
provision. 
First, this Act evidences Congress' strong advocacy of the fair-
ness doctrine. As a political warning to the Commission and its 
Chairman, Mark Fowler,129 members continually asserted their 
Commission's position was not lost on the court. Meredith, 809 F.2d at 868 n.3 ("We 
must admit that for the Commission to adopt such a cautious position on the propriety 
of judicial review here is somewhat puzzling in light of what it argued in RTNDA."); 
RTNDA, 809 F.2d at 862. The failure of the Commission to have the constitutional is-
sues raised in RTNDA and their unwanted arising in Meredith put the Commission in a 
difficult political position. RTNDA involved a challenge to the FCC's 1985 Fairness Re-
port. Because the Report concluded that the fairness doctrine unconstitutionally chilled 
free speech, the broadcasters argued, the FCC's refusal to eliminate the doctrine was 
arbitrary and capricious. RTNDA, 809 F.2d at 862. The goal of the litigants in RTNDA 
was to have the court declare the fairness doctrine unconstitutional. This would free the 
FCC from taking action on its own and protect it from the anger of Congress, which 
supported the fairness doctrine. Meredith, on the contrary, resulted in the court remand-
ing the constitutionality issue to the Commission for its decision. The court chastised the 
FCC position stating, "[W]e are aware of no precedent that permits a federal agency to 
ignore a constitutional challenge to the application of its own policy merely because the 
resolution would be politically awkward." Meredith, 809 F.2d at 874 (footnote omitted). 
126. Members of Congress have had a long history of supporting the fairness doc-
trine. Many of them utilized the doctrine and the similar political candidate provision (§ 
315) in their own campaigns. 
127. See Industry Turns Aside Hill Move to Codify Fairness, BROADCASTING, Oct. 13, 
1986, at 43 [hereinafter Move to Codify Fairness]. The Senate reflected its disagreement 
with the apparently imminent demise of the fairness doctrine by demanding that the 
Commission reopen the inquiry that produced the 1985 Fairness Report. The House 
went one step further and, in a move led by Speaker Thomas P. (Tip) O'Neill, Jr., at-
tempted to reassert the doctrine's codification by reenacting it in statutory form. Id. The 
move was thwarted in part by the massive lobbying effort of the National Association of 
Broadcasters. Id. Also, some members felt that the complex, end-of-year appropriations 
bill, onto which the reenactment was attached, was an inappropriate piece of legislation 
in which to insert the doctrine. Id. The resulting compromise, very similar to the Sen-
ate's original version of the legislation, was passed and signed into law as part of the 
appropriations bill. 
128. Continuing Appropriations for 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-500, 100 Stat. 1783, 1783-67 
(1986). 
129. Fowler (FCC Chairman, 1981-1987) was a dedicated opponent of the fairness 
doctrine. See Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 
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dedicated support for the doctrine during the debates.130 
Second, Congress pointedly declared that the Commission 
could not repeal the fairness doctrine or materially change its 
enforcement of the doctrine. By directing FCC funding toward 
alternative means of administration and enforcement of the doc-
trine, the Act impliedly precluded the Commission from using 
appropriations to repeal or weaken the doctrine. This was the 
reading Congress gave the legislation. All speakers in the de-
bates expressed agreement that the amendment completely pre-
vented FCC repeal of the fairness doctrine.131 Some members of 
Congress went even further and proposed that any change in the 
material enforcement of the fairness doctrine while the Commis-
sion considered alternatives would be considered a violation of 
congressional intent. 132 Congress unambiguously demanded that 
TEX. L. REV. 207 (1982). Congressional opposition to any FCC repeal of the fairness doc-
trine may have been reinforced by Chairman Fowler's style and activities as head of the 
FCC. J. TUNSTALL, supra note 49, at 248-51; Move to Codify Fairness, supra note 127. 
Dennis Patrick replaced Fowler as Chairman in 1987. 
130. See, e.g., 132 CONG. REC. Sl6,736 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1986) (statement of Sen. 
Hollings); 132 CONG. REC. HH,075 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986) (statement of Rep. Dingell). 
During consideration of the amendments, no member spoke in opposition to either the 
amendment or the fairness doctrine itself. This suggests congressional support for the 
fairness doctrine as policy. 
131. See, e.g., 132 CONG. REC. HH,075 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986) ("[T]he conferees do 
not intend this provision ... to authorize or permit the FCC to repeal or materially 
revise the [fairness) obligation .... " (statement of Rep. Dingell) (referring to the dis-
cussion of the amendment in the statement of managers)). This prohibition against re-
peal did not expire with the Commission's issuance of the required report. See, e.g., 132 
CONG. REC. S16,736 (daily ed. Oct 16, 1986) ("It is not the intent of the conferees by the 
inclusion of this language to support or permit repeal of the fairness doctrine at any 
t[i]me, even after the required report is filed. In fact, just the opposite is the case. The 
conferees continue to strongly support the fairness doctrine." (statement of Sen. Hol-
lings)). But see Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863, 873 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting 
that the Corµmission claimed that it was not legally bound by the statements in the 
Committee reports on the fairness doctrine legislation). 
132. This position was stated most explicitly in the Statement of Managers of the 
Conference Report: "It is the intent of the conferees that the Federal Communications 
Commission shall not change the regulation concerning the Fairness Doctrine without 
submitting the required report to Congress on this matter." CONFERENCE REPORT MAK-
ING CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS, FOR F1scAL YEAR 1987, H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1005, 99th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 431 (1986); see, e.g., 132 CONG. REC. HH,075 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986); 132 
CONG. REC. S16,736 (daily ed. Oct 16, 1986) (statement of Sen. Hollings) ("The FCC 
should not make any material changes in the regulation implementing the fairness doc-
trine. This would be counter to the direction of the conferees."); 
The Members of the Senate-House conference were particularly concerned that 
during the pendency of the report required in this legislation that the FCC take 
no action to make material[] changes in regard to the fairness doctrine. The 
Members also believed the Commission should not even take such action after 
the report is required. 
Id. (statement of Sen. Hollings). 
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the FCC maintain its traditional role as enforcer of the fairness 
doctrine. 
Third, by declaring an intention to limit the FCC's ability to 
repeal the doctrine, Congress forcefully reasserted legislative 
control over the fairness doctrine. Finding the doctrine enacted 
into Section 315, members declared the FCC's opposition to the 
doctrine an usurpation of the role of Congress. 133 But the intent 
of Congress to claim control of the doctrine as a statutory enact-
ment becomes most clear in the text itself. The final clause man-
dates that the Commission report back to Congress.134 The im-
plication of this language and its ostensible purpose is for 
Congress, not the Commission, to play its legislative role and 
make a decision on the worth of the fairness doctrine.136 The 
rather simple wording of the resolution actually masks a clear 
congressional intent to support the fairness doctrine, to regard it 
as an enactment of Congress rather than a regulation of the 
FCC, and to prevent that agency from repealing or diminishing 
enforcement of the doctrine. 
In this sense, the Act has a very material impact on the status 
of the fairness doctrine. As a congressional interpretation of the 
intent underlying a statute enacted by a previous Congress, the 
133. 132 CONG. REC. Hll,075 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986) (statement of Rep. Dingell that 
the fairness doctrine was found in § 315 of the Communications Act). 
The very language of the debates indicates that the Members of both Houses believed 
that they were dealing with the fairness doctrine as a legislative mandate and not as a 
mere agency regulation. Members' speeches showed their belief that the FCC could not 
repeal the fairness doctrine under the Commission's own power. These same terms indi-
cated that only congressional action could repeal the doctrine. Members stated that Con-
gress would have to "authorize," "permit," and "support" any action taken by the FCC 
for that action to legally repeal the doctrine. See, e.g., 132 CoNG. REC. Hll,075 (daily ed. 
Oct. 15, 1986) (statement of Rep. Dingell); 132 CoNG. REC. Sl6,736 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 
1986) (statement of Sen. Rudman). 
One member seemed to consider that Congress' action in limiting the FCC was proof 
that the fairness doctrine "obligation [is] unambiguously part of the Communications 
Act." 132 CONG. REC. Hll,075 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986) (statement of Rep. Dingell). This 
speech may have been part of Speaker O'Neill's attempt to codify the doctrine. See 
supra note 127. 
134. The Commission announced the resulting report, Fairness Doctrine Alternatives, 
63 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 488 (1987), at the same meeting that it repealed the doctrine. 
135. 132 CONG. REC. Hll,075 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986). 
[T]he provision in the bill merely directs the FCC to study alternative ways of 
administering and enforcing the doctrine, and to forward to Congress for its con-
sideration any recommendations it may have for improving the manner in which 
the doctrine is administered and enforced. It was my personal understanding 
and intent that the FCC should do nothing to usurp the Congress' role in any 
reexamination of this doctrine. 
Id. (statement of Rep. Smith). 
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joint resolution is entitled to great weight.136 Congress expressed 
its disagreement with the TRAC decision and established a solid 
statutory position for the fairness doctrine by declaring that the 
fairness doctrine is found in section 315. Congress' action could 
very well be considered a binding affirmation of the legislative 
status of the fairness doctrine. 
By prohibiting the Commission from revoking or weakening 
enforcement of the doctrine, the resolution presents a new stan-
dard against which to judge Commission action. Weakened en-
forcement of the fairness doctrine may be a violation of the Act. 
The legislation also establishes a new set of criteria for the FCC, 
severely limiting the discretion allowed the Commission. 137 
In 1987, both Houses of Congress overwhelmingly passed leg-
islation that would have codified the fairness doctrine. 138 Presi-
dent Reagan immediately vetoed the legislation.139 The Fairness 
in Broadcasting Act reaffirmed that the fairness doctrine had 
136. Cf. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 369, 380-81 (1969) (citing FHA 
v. Darlington, Inc. 358 U.S. 84, 90 (1958); Alexander v. Mayor of Alexandria, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 1 (1809)). 
137. Administrative law formerly allowed the Commission to make any changes so 
long as they did not contravene the Commission's legislative duty. This discretion was 
such that the Commission could vary the level of enforcement due to the vagaries of the 
1959 amendment. Now, under the Act, a weakenin·g of the doctrine's enforcement vio-
lates the Commission's mandate. 
But the legislative intent to prevent any reduction in enforcement of the doctrine 
presents some difficulties. No clear, adequate level of enforcement existed prior to pas-
sage. If judged against the level of enforcement at the time of passage, the requirement is 
nonsensical. The fairness doctrine was not being materially enforced in late 1986. The 
only possible meaningful interpretation is that members wished for the doctrine to be 
enforced at its traditional level. Such an interpretation would reasonably accord the con-
gressional intent to support and protect the fairness doctrine with the actual wording of 
the statute. In light of this intent and its reflection in statutory form, the Commission is 
now bound to a more exacting standard of enforcement. 
138. Fairness in Broadcasting Act of 1987, H.R. 1934, S. 742, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1987). The legislation passed both houses with heavy majorities. Senate Votes Fairness 
Bill, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1987, at C26, col.5 (Senate vote 59-31 for passage); House 
Approues Law on Fairness in Broadcasting, N.Y. Times, June 4, 1987, at Al, col. 5 
(House vote 302-102 for passage). 
139. Veto of the Fairness in Broadcasting Act of 1987, Message to the Senate Re-
turning S. 742 Without Approval, 23 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 715 (June 29, 1987) 
[hereinafter Veto]. The President, in a statement reportedly written with the assistance 
of former FCC Chairman Mark Fowler, Ghost, BROADCASTING, June 22, 1987, at 7, found 
the doctrine unconstitutional because of the doctrine's repression of free speech, the dis-
appearance of broadcast scarcity, and the intent of the first amendment framers. Veto, 
supra, at 715. 
Congress referred the vetoed legislation to Committee to either preserve the option of 
overriding the veto or of attaching the bill to a "must pass" piece of legislation as a rider. 
Reagan Vetoes Fairness Doctrine Bill, BROADCASTING, June 29, 1987, at 27. 
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been codified in 1959 and then recodified the doctrine in section 
315.140 
While enacting the legislation, Congress specifically attacked 
the 1985 Fairness Report. Finding that "the Commission's con-
clusions . . . are factually flawed, are based on erroneous legal 
analysis, and are entitled to no deference,"141 Congress reas-
serted its view that broadcast content regulation was necessary 
due to the scarcity of the airwaves, that the fairness doctrine 
had succeeded in bringing diverse viewpoints to broadcast lis-
teners, and that the doctrine had been previously codified in 
1959.142 For the first time, the Congress noted the newly restric-
tive standards used against petitioners making fairness doctrine 
claims and decried the unfair burden placed on broadcast 
petitioners. 148 
3. Formal Commission abolition of the fairness doctrine-
Freed from doubt about its ability to repeal the doctrine by the 
TRAC decision, assured of executive support by the presidential 
veto, and given the opportunity to act by the Meredith decision, 
the FCC Commissioners, on August 4, 1987, unanimously 
adopted a decision repealing the fairness doctrine. 144 The Com-
mission's decision abolishing the doctrine rested predominately 
on the findings of the 1985 Fairness Report. iu The Commission 
found the 1985 Report's conclusions determinative on the issue 
of a fairness doctrine-caused chilling effect.146 Using the 1985 
Report's analysis, the Commission concluded that the fairness 
doctrine was unnecessary as a means to promote diverse view-
points due to the massive increase in media outlets.147 But un-
140. Fairness in Broadcasting Act of 1987, H.R. 1934, S. 742, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1987). 
141. S. REP. No. 34, supra note 75, at 4. 
142. S. 742, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). 
143. The House Report found the 1974 Fairness Report to be the defining statement 
of fairness doctrine enforcement criteria. H.R. REP. No. 108, supra note 75, at 25. "The 
Commission is not required under H.R. 1934 to impose burdens on complainants higher 
than those outlined in the 1974 Report." Id. at 26. Yet, the Act itself set the enforcement 
level "consistent with the rules and policies of the Commission in effect on January 1, 
1987." S. 742, § 3, para. 2, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). See supra note 137 for a similar 
problem with previous fairness doctrine legislation. 
144. Syracuse Peace Council, 63 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 541 (1987), appeal docketed, 
No. 87-1516 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 14, 1987); see Geller v. FCC, No. 87-1544 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 5, 
1987) (challenging FCC repeal of the fairness doctrine). 
145. See, e.g., Syracuse Peace Council, 63 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at 543-45, 565; Fair-
ness Held, Unfair, supra note 69, at 27, 29, 30 (transcript of FCC proceedings that re-
pealed the fairness doctrine and based the decision on facts culled from the 1985 
Report). 
146. Syracuse Peace Council, 63 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at 565-70. 
147. Id. at 570-72. 
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like before, when the Commission had refused to extend the ar-
gument to attack the scarcity rationale, us this time, the 
Commission argued outright that "the scarcity rationale devel-
oped in the Red Lion decision . . . no longer justifies a different 
standard of First Amendment review for the electronic press. "149 
The Commission's position justifies not only an attack on the 
constitutionality of the fairness doctrine, but also on broadcast 
content regulation in general.1110 The Commission had, appar-
ently, achieved its goal in repealing the fairness doctrine for-
mally and could now proceed to other aspects of broadcast 
regulation. 
Ill. ASSESSMENT 
The legality of the Commission's limited enforcement and re-
peal of the fairness doctrine depends on whether the Commis-
sion has violated the legislation creating the doctrine. When the 
Commission's actions are considered in light of its mandate, it 
becomes clear that the Commission acted illegally in covertly 
and, later, overtly, repealing the fairness doctrine. 
148. See supra note 69. 
149. Syracuse Peace Council, 63 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at 574-75. The FCC also held 
that "the concept of scarcity ... is irrelevant" as a constitutional principle. Id. at 581. 
The Commission attempted to present this attack on scarcity as a reiteration of its 
conclusion in the 1985 Report. Fairness Held Unfair, supra note 69, at 30 ("[W]e reaf-
firm our finding in the 1985 report that scarcity is not a [constitutionally] valid distin-
guishing justification."). But the 1985 Fairness Report did not review the increase in 
media outlets to evaluate the scarcity rationale. Indeed, the Report refused to pass judg-
ment on scarcity as a constitutionally justifying rationale for broadcast content regula-
tion. 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 2, at 35,421 ("We do not believe that it is neces-
sary or appropriate for us to make that determination in this proceeding.") Rather, the 
1985 Fairness Report's conclusion on media availability went to the issue of whether the 
fairness doctrine was needed to increase the diversity of viewpoints broadcast consistent 
with the public interest standard. Id. at 35,440. 
150. The Commission's public statements downplayed the significance of this finding: 
"[This decision] does not extend beyond the doctrine to codified laws like equal time. It 
does not rule on the commission's other content rules such as issue responsive program-
ming and prime time access. And it leaves intact the Commission's ability to license and 
regulate in the public interest." Fairness Held Unfair, supra note 69, at 30. Although 
certainly, the Syracuse proceeding did not extend to other content laws, it did repudiate 
the constitutional basis that directly supports those laws. See The Good, the Bad, and 
the Ugly, BROADCASTING, Aug. 10, 1987, at 59 ("If the trend continues, and the FCC's 
radical constitutional analysis is pursued, we can anticipate the demise of candidate ac-
cess to the airwaves and equal time requirements, as well." (statement of Rep. Dingell)). 
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The true assessment of FCC actions takes place in the court-
room.151 There, judicial review of FCC actions based on the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act152 provides several interconnected 
means to evaluate FCC regulation and deregulation of the fair-
ness doctrine. m Under the Administrative Procedure Act, courts 
may find Commission action unlawful if it is: (1) arbitrary and 
capricious, (2) unconstitutional, (3) outside of statutory right; 
(4) violative of lawful procedure, (5) unsupported by substantial 
evidence, or (6) unwarranted by the facts. 154 Although the sec-
tions are listed separately, courts often read the statute such 
that categories two through six collapse into the first category of 
arbitrary and capricious action. 155 For instance, an agency may 
come to a reasonable, rational conclusion, but if the agency does 
not announce the evidence and reasoning supporting its conclu-
sion, the agency action will be found arbitrary and capricious 
due to the court's inability to review the grounds for that deci-
sion. 156 Although the arbitrary and capricious standard appears 
to be a catch-all provision, it remains a provision into which 
various Commission abuses of discretion neatly fit and deserves 
to be considered separately from the more specific requirements. 
Likewise, the other standards of review also fulfill a unique and 
separable position in the courts' review of FCC enforcement of 
the fairness doctrine. 
151. E. KRASNOW, L. LONGLEY & H. TERRY, THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION 
62 (3d ed. 1982); J. TUNSTALL, supra note 49, at 258. 
152. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
153. These provisions of administrative law apply not only to agency action, but to 
agency inaction as well. 5 U.S.C § 706(1) (1982); see, e.g., Medical Comm. for Human 
Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 401 U.S. 973 (1971), 
vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972). Thus, the void that constituted FCC enforcement 
of the fairness doctrine before the repeal is just as actionable and remediable by the 
courts as any rulemaking, adjudication, or affirmative action undertaken by the 
Commission. 
154. 5 u.s.c. § 706(2) (1982). 
155. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 719 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 
1983) (holding agency actions are arbitrary and capricious if they fail to meet statutory, 
procedural, or constitutional requirements or are unsupported by evidence); National 
Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688 (2d Cir.) (holding inadequacy of 
explanation constituted arbitrary and capricious action), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 
(1975); Associated Indus. v. Department of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 349-50 (2d Cir. 1973) 
(Friendly, J.): "[I]n the review of rules of general applicability made after notice and 
comment rulemaking, the two criteria [the arbitrary and capricious standard and the 
substantial evidence test] do tend to converge"; Calcutta E. Coast of India & E. Paki-
stan/U.S.A. Conference v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 399 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1968) 
(finding agency action arbitrary and capricious when it went beyond the scope of its 
statutory boundaries in making a decision without support in the record). 
156. See infra note 198 and accompanying text. 
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When a court reviews an administrative agency's decision, it 
first considers whether the agency followed its constitutional 
limitations and legislative mandates. The first amendment and 
various legislative acts offer grounds on which to challenge FCC 
nonenforcement and repeal of the fairness doctrine. 
1. The first amendment- The Red Lion Court held that the 
first amendment right of the listener to hear programming in the 
public interest was paramount to the broadcaster's right to con-
trol his frequency. 1117 Because the Court found that the fairness 
doctrine served the first amendment as an "affirmative promo-
tion of the system of freedom of expression,"158 Commission 
debilitation of that doctrine is arguably a restriction on listeners' 
first amendment rights.159 
The courts have rejected this first amendment argument. 
Courts have refused to find that the first amendment mandates 
rather than simply permits Commission enforcement of the fair-
ness doctrine.160 The courts fear that constitutionally requiring 
FCC determination of broadcast content would disturb the equi-
poise between public and private rights and interests in broad-
casting and would result in the "frightening specter" of govern-
ment censorship and control.161 Consequently, the Commission 
157. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is the right of 
the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount. ... It 
is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and 
other ideas and experiences which is crucial here."); Editorializing by Broadcast Li-
censes, supra note 14, at 1249. 
158. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 660 (1970); see Red Lion, 
395 U.S. at 393-94. 
159. Such was the position of the plaintiffs in Public Interest Research Group v. 
FCC, 522 F.2d 1060, 1067 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 965 (1976). In Public 
Interest Research Group, the court upheld the Commission's decision to exclude com-
mercial advertisements from the fairness doctrine. The plaintiffs, an environmental 
group demanding response time to a set of snowmobile advertisements, charged that the 
Commission's exclusion violated the first amendment. 
160. Id. at 1067-68 (discussing application of the fairness doctrine to product adver-
tisements, "[W]e cannot say that the first amendment requires the Commission to force 
the presentation of alternate views."). 
161. CBS v. Democratic Nat') Comm., 4_12 U.S. 94, 120-21, 133 (1972) (stating that a 
rigid enforcement of the fairness doctrine and access requirements "in the name of the 
First Amendment would be a contradiction."); see FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 
U.S. 582, 604 (1981) (rejecting an argument that the first amendment requires Commis-
sion programming review); Public Interest Research Group, 522 F.2d at 1067-68; see also 
Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (striking down access requirements for the 
print media). 
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can diminish fairness doctrine enforcement without violating the 
first amendment. 
2. Legislation- The courts must also review and strike 
down acts by the Commission that violate its statutory man-
dates.162 Three such mandates empower and restrict FCC action. 
Under each of these legislative requirements the courts would 
discern different mandates and would reach different conclu-
sions about the Commissi9n's weakened enforcement of the fair-
ness doctrine. 
The first mandate is the public interest standard announced 
in the Communications Act of 1934.163 The Commission adopted 
the fairness doctrine under this general grant of power to serve 
the public interest. This broad and expansive standard by itself, 
however, simply allows the Commission to enforce the fairness 
doctrine. It does not mandate its enforcement.164 
Consequently, the public interest standard precludes Commis-
sion repeal of the fairness doctrine only if the Commission vio-
lates administrative law by failing to explain its changed inter-
pretation of the public interest standard. 1611 Due to the broad 
powers delegated to the Commission by that standard, however, 
a simple change in the level of enforcement of the doctrine 
would be well within the agency's discretion. If the public inter-
est standard alone supported FCC enforcement of the fairness 
doctrine, this would be the limit of statutory review. 
A second statutory mandate requires more than the public in-
terest standard. The 1959 amendment, accepted by the Commis-
sion as an explicit codification of the doctrine, imposed new re-
quirements on the Commission.166 In so doing, Congress restated 
the fairness doctrine "far more explicit[ly] than the generalized 
'public interest' standard."167 Because the Commission obviously 
162. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C); Public Interest Research Group, 522 F.2d at 1060. 
163. See supra note 3. 
164. United States v. Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. 157, 173 (1968); NBC v. United 
States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943). 
165. See infra notes 197-99 and accompanying text. 
166. See supra notes 19-29 and accompanying text. 
167. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 385-86 (1969): 
The Communications Act is not notable for the precision of its substantive stan-
dards and in this respect the explicit provisions of section 315, and the doctrine 
and rules at issue here which are closely modeled upon that section, are far more 
explicit than the generalized "public interest" standard in which the Commis-
sion ordinarily finds its sole guidance, and which we have held a broad but ade-
quate standard before. 
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may not repeal statutory law, 168 the Commission's 1987 repeal is 
illegal. When the Commission quietly weakens enforcement of 
the doctrine, however, this explicit standard is of little use. The 
simple statement in Section 315, imposing an obligation on a 
broadcaster to afford a reasonable opportunity for discussion of 
conflicting views on issues of public importance, presents no spe-
cific obligation for the Commission. The Commission has long 
been allowed freedom and discretion in enforcing section 315 
due to the simplicity of the statutory language.169 With the dis-
cretion that the Commission holds, even under section 315, a 
change in enforcement of the doctrine would not contravene the 
legislative mandate. 
Given the extent of the Commission's inactive enforcement of 
the fairness doctrine, though, to dismiss the Commission's policy 
shift as a mere change in the level of enforcement is difficult. 
The extreme reduction in enforcement action constituted virtual 
repeal of the doctrine, or at least a crippling of it to the point of 
a de facto repeal. 170 The Commission, therefore, has violated 
both the public interest standard and the section 315 
obligation.171 
The final statutory mandate overcomes the inadequacies of 
the other discretionary provisions. The 1986 budget amend-
ment,172 most importantly, specifically limits discretion in en-
forcement by mandating that any material change in enforce-
ment would be illegal. Moreover, through the provision, 
Congress rejected the TRAC court's dicta that the doctrine is a 
Commission creation subject solely to the broad mandate of the 
public interest standard. The Act reasserts the legislative view 
that the doctrine is a statutory creature subject to the explicit 
168. See, e.g., 1974 Fairness Report, supra note 30, at 52 ("(l]n view of sections 
315(a) and 3(h) of the Communications Act, the Commission could not abandon the fair-
ness doctrine."). 
169. Id. at 1. ("[W]e did emphasize that these statutory standards [§ 315(a)] were 
broad in nature and that therefore 'there can and must be considerable leeway in both 
policy formulation and application in specific cases.' "); see also Public Interest Research 
Group v. FCC, 522 F.2d 1060, 1066 (1st Cir. 1975) (finding that a complainant's attempt 
to read specific requirements into § 315 "assumes a degree of legislative specificity which 
simply does not exist"), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 965 (1976). 
170. Some commentators have argued that this was in fact the case. E.g., J. TUN-
STALL, supra note 49, at 4 ("Controls on content . . . were removed; radio station manag-
ers now had almost no formal obligations, and de facto fairly secure tenor."); Minow, 
supra note 75; Nossiter, The FCC's Big Giveaway Show, NATION, Oct. 26, 1985, at 402. 
171. But see Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Telecommunica-
tions Research & Action Center v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 
S. Ct. 3196 (1987) (discussed supra notes 117-25 & accompanying text). 
172. See supra notes 126-38 and accompanying text. 
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mandates of section 315 and the budget provision itself. The bill 
codifying the fairness doctrine, even though vetoed by the Presi-
dent, constitutes a persuasive statement of belief that the fair-
ness doctrine is a statutorily enacted law.173 A court using these· 
statutory provisions as a guide would find the Commission in 
violation of the intent of the Congress as expressed inherently in 
the language of the legislation. m 
B. Judicial Review Under the Arbitrary and Capricious 
Standard 
The scope of judicial review under the arbitrary and capri-
cious standard varies with the context of the case.1111 A review by 
the courts may be either extremely deferential, or searching and 
careful.176 The courts have used both forms of review in the 
many challenges to FCC deregulation.177 An evaluation of Com-
173. See R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 180-81 
(1979) (stating that legislative statements unapproved of by the executive are a reliable 
basis for interpreting the intent of Congress). 
174. But see Meredith, 809 F.2d at 873, n.11 (noting in dicta that the language of the 
Act does not appear to mandate the fairness doctrine). Although the language in the 
provision does not directly mandate enforcement, it does so indirectly by indicating that 
the doctrine is actually a codified law rather than an adopted regulation. 
175. See WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Natural Resources 
Defense Council v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1049-51 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
Sometimes, the form of agency action, whether adjudicatory or rulemaking, will deter-
mine the level of a court's review. At other times that level will be determined by the 
substance of an agency's action. 
176. Compare Georgia Power Project v. FCC, 559 F.2d 237, 240 (5th Cir. 1977) (dis-
cussing Commission fairness doctrine action, "[I]t will be a rare case indeed when rever-
sal is warranted.") with NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, 453 F. Supp. 280, 304 
(D. Del. 1978) ("The arbitrary and capricious standard of review, however, is not a ritu-
alistic procedure by which courts summarily endorse agency actions as correct."), re-
manded on other grounds sub nom. NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 599 F.2d 1247 (3d 
Cir. 1979). Whatever the courts happen to call their review, be it traditional arbitrary 
and capricious or "hard look" arbitrary and capricious, the whole range of review can be 
collapsed into the simple standard of "reasonableness." B. SCHWARZ, ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW § 10.37 (2d ed. 1984). 
177. See, e.g., Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 821 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(finding FCC explanations for the abandonment of children's programming regulations 
inadequate); Telecommunications Research Action Comm. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. 
Cir. 1986) (challenging the nonapplication of the fairness doctrine to teletext); National 
Black Media Coalition v. FCC, 706 F.2d 1224 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (upholding ascertainment 
deregulation); Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 
1413, 1425 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (challenging changes in logging requirements); Telocator Net-
work of Am. v. FCC, 691 F.2d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (upholding FCC allocation of radio 
frequencies); Geller v. FCC, 610 F.2d 973 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (striking down Commission 
cable regulations as arbitrary and capricious); Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 
756 F.2d 899 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (challenging an end to children's programming require-
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mission action under the different levels of review demonstrates 
that the FCC has acted arbitrarily and capriciously in its dereg-
ulation of the fairness doctrine. 
1. Adjudication- The Commission's abandonment of fair-
ness doctrine enforcement is most clearly apparent in the 
agency's case law, the actual application of fairness doctrine 
rules to broadcasting situations. The significant decline in the 
number of these cases provides the most dramatic indication 
that the Commission has changed its enforcement of the doc-
trine. 178 In fact, the Commission repealed the doctrine, not 
through rulemaking, but in case law. Yet, in reviewing agency 
action, courts show the greatest deference to agency adjudica-
tion. 179 By deferring to this type of agency decision, courts will 
overturn only those Commission decisions unsupported by sub-
stantial evidence.18° For an FCC adjudication to be upheld, the 
decision must simply show some evidence supporting its hold-
ing.181 Under this test, only one court has overruled an FCC fair-
ness doctrine decision as too lenient towards a broadcaster.182 
ments); Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 560 F.2d 529 
(2d Cir. 1977) (finding Commission action lowering minority employment requirements 
arbitrary and capricious); National Ass'n of Independent Television Producers & Direc-
tors v. FCC, 516 F.2d 526, 542-43 (2d Cir. 1975) (finding restrictions on television broad-
cast of motion pictures to be arbitrary and capricious). 
178. See supra note 94. 
179. See, e.g., Georgia Power Project v. FCC, 559 F.2d 237 (5th Cir. 1979). The courts 
have ignored the change in fairness doctrine enforcement. E.g., Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 
809 F.2d 863, 873 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("It is patently obvious that because of non-legislative 
expressions of congressional concern, the Commission does not wish to weaken enforce-
ment of the fairness doctrine .... "). The courts' deferential standard derives from the 
belief that the adjudicatory proceeding is an arena of FCC expertise. See WWHT, Inc. v. 
FCC, 656 F.2d 807, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 
F.2d 458 (D.C. Ci,r. 1977); Natural Resources Defense Council v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 
1053 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Furthermore, ·commission actions represent the Commission's in-
terpretation of its purpose as legislated by Congress. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41-42 (1983); American Trucking Ass'n v. 
Atchison T. & S.F. Ry., 387 U.S. 397, 416 (1967). 
180. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1982); see Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973); Crowell v. 
Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932); NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 179 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 
1950). 
181. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 67 (5th ed. 1973). Substantial evidence means 
"such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion." Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951). 
182. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543 
(D.C. Cir. 1969). 
Then-Judge Burger found that the Commission's decision to grant a license to a 
broadcaster charged with fairness doctrine violations was unsupported by substantial ev-
idence due to the biased and erroneous actions of the hearing examiner. Office of Com-
munication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See 
generally F. FRIENDLY, THE Goon Guvs, THE BAD Guvs AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 89-102 
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Application of the substantial evidence test to the Commis-
sion's fairness doctrine cases would inevitably result in the up-
holding of those decisions. Each case contains a sufficient recita-
tion of facts and reasoning to satisfy the reasonable evidence 
test. The repeal, couched in the substantial evidence provided 
by the 1985 Fairness Report, would be met with the deference of 
a reviewing court because there is substantial, if unpersuasive, 
evidence supporting the Commission's decision. Because of this 
usual level of review, the Commission's departure from its tradi-
tional policy would remain invisible or permissible to the review-
ing court. As a result the court would uphold the Commission's 
decision. 
Not surprisingly, the Commission began to subtly repeal the 
fairness doctrine through case by case exaggeration of the stan-
dards rather than through outright, open rulemaking. The 
courts' deferential posture ensured that the judiciary would not 
step in to correct the Commission's emasculation of the fairness 
doctrine provision. The nature of the adjudicatory process, with 
scattered decisions announcing the demise of the fairness doc-
trine, allowed the Commission to conceal its policy without chal-
lenge from the courts or reaction from Congress until forced to 
act openly by Meredith. 183 Viewed individually, the decisions do 
not appear irrational or unreasonable. Each appears to base its 
. decision on the traditional obligations of petitioner and broad-
caster. Only when the Commission decisions are viewed as a 
whole, in the light of previous fairness doctrine rulings, and in 
the context of the Commission's campaign against the doctrine, 
do agency departures from its long-standing doctrine emerge. 
The substantial evidence test does not preclude such a com-
prehensive review. Using a form of heightened arbitrary and ca-
pricious review, a court could compare present and prior cases 
and recognize the political goals of the Commission. Under this 
standard of review, courts may defer to agency decisions, but 
they are obligated to undertake a heightened scrutiny in the 
form of a "hard look" review.184 A hard look review constitutes a 
(1975) (recounting the full story of station WLBT, Jackson, Mississippi, the station in-
volved in United Church of Christ). 
183. Meredith Broadcasting v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1987). See generally L. 
JAFFE, Jumc1AL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 588 (1965); Shapiro, The Choice of 
Rulerriaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. 
REV. 921 (1965). 
184. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413, 
1424 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Telocator Network of Am. v. FCC, 691 F.2d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
Some have questioned the survival of the "hard look" doctrine since the Supreme 
Court's decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense 
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more rigorous application of the arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard.1811 Courts using a hard look standard review agency deci-
sions more broadly and inquisitively when the agency "has not 
really taken a 'hard look' at the salient problems and has not 
genuinely engaged in reasoned decision making."186 This stan-
dard of review ensures that agencies follow procedures in a way 
that allows any reviewing court to assess the agency's actions. As 
such, the standard stops short of complete de novo review but 
does constitute a "substantial inquiry" into the decision of the 
agency.187 Thus, the failure of an agency to take a hard look at 
an issue requires the courts to take a hard look at the agency. 
Certain "danger signals," indicating agency abuse of discre-
tion, alert courts to the need for a higher level of review.188 Sev-
eral such danger signals appear in the FCC's current fairness 
doctrine action. 
The first of these is agency bias. If a court believes the Com-
mission is engaging in biased and partial enforcement of the 
fairness doctrine, the court may choose to use the hard look 
Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978), which restricted judicial review of agency decisions to a 
review of the procedures mandated by the Administrative Procedures Act. S. BREYER & 
R. STEWART, supra note 32, at 616-17. Subsequent decisions, however, appear to have 
allowed the continued vitality of the "hard look" review. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. 
Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983); United Church of Christ, 
707 F.2d at 1413. 
185. United Church of Christ, 707 F.2d at 1425 n.23 ("The heightened level of scru-
tiny is frequently referred to as the 'hard look' doctrine."). 
186. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 403 U.S. 923 (1970); see Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 
415, 416 (1970) (requiring "a thorough, probing, in-depth review," also "searching and 
careful"); see also Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Court, 
122 U. PA. L. REV. 509 (1974). 
187. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415. 
188. Greater Boston, 444 F.2d at 851; United Church of Christ, 707 F.2d at 1425. 
Courts have based their hard look reviews on other danger signals. E.g., Natural Re-
sources Defense Council v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (finding the importance 
of the problem considered by the agency may necessitate a hard look review); Standard 
Rate & Data Serv. v. United States Postal Serv., 584 F.2d 473 (D.C. Cir. 1978) Uustifying 
judicial intervention when the agency based its decision on a judicial opinion that the 
courts are better suited to interpret); Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 
F.2d 584, 597-98 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (finding agency decisions affecting "fundamental per-
sonal interests" will justify stricter judicial review); Greater Boston, 444 F.2d at 850 
(holding the FCC's rejection of a hearing examiner's report may alert the court to the 
need for a hard look); WAIT Radio v. FCC, 418 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (finding 
perfunctory treatment of important issues justifies a hard look); Rodgers, Judicial Re-
view of Risk Assessments: the Role of Decision Theory in Unscrambling the Benzene 
Decision, 11 ENVTL. L. 302, 301 (1981) (the reviewing court's opinion on the wisdom of 
the agency action may determine use of stricter review). Compare NAACP v. Wilming-
ton Medical Center, 453 F. Supp. 280 (D. Del. 1978) (holding complex issues may allow 
courts to intervene) with Rodgers, supra, at 309 (the more complex an issue the less 
likely the courts are to review it intensely). 
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standard in its review.189 Statements of the former Chairman,190 
the 1985 Fairness Report, and the political mood of the Com-
mission reveal a definite Commission desire to do away with the 
fairness doctrine. The courts have, in fact, frequently rebuked 
the FCC for its dangerous overenthusiasm in deregulating the 
broadcast industry. 191 At 'the time, these warnings urged the 
Commission to pay closer heed to the Commission's legislative 
purpose. Now, they stand as an indication of the courts' fear of 
agency bias and of the courts' predisposition to engage in a more-
searching review of Commission action. 
Another danger signal, more often invoked by courts to justify 
a hard look review, is an agency's action eliminating a long-
standing policy.192 The FCC underwent a hard look review when 
it eliminated ascertainment and logging procedures.193 The Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit upheld the deregulation of the ascer-
tainment procedures under a traditional deferential review. Be-
cause the ascertainment procedures were promulgated only 
recently· by the Commission, their repeal did not trigger a hard 
look. The court justified a "close scrutiny" review of the logging 
deregulation, on the other hand, because of the Commission's 
abrupt abolition of a traditional policy.194 Elimination of the 
fairness doctrine, a doctrine followed since 1927, or even a sig-
189. Central Fla. Enter., Inc. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 
441 U.S. 957 (1979); see Natural Resources Defense Council v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. 
Cir. 1979); S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 32, at 285 (suggesting courts use a 
stricter standard of review when assessing agencies that have "tunnel vision" or are 
biased). 
190. E.g., 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 2, at 35,454 (concurrence by Chairman 
Fowler); Fowler & Brenner, supra note 129; see League of Women Voters v. FCC, 468 
U.S. 364, 376-77 n.11 (1984) (noting Chairman Fowler's criticism of the fairness 
doctrine). 
191. See, e.g., Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 
F.2d 1413, 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (discussed infra text accompanying note 206); Telocator 
Network of Am. v. FCC, 691 F.2d 525, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("We. think, however, that 
the Commission comes perilously close here to crossing the line between pursuit of a 
legitimate regulatory policy using competition to further the public interest and abdica-
tion of its regulatory duty."). 
192. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel, 
435 U.S. 519, 542 (1978) (stating in dicta, "It might also be true, although we do not ... 
decide it, that a totally unjustified departure from well-settled procedures of long stand-
ing might require judicial correction."); United Church of Christ, 707 F.2d at 1439; 
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850 (D.C. Cir.) (engaging in a 
hard look when the FCC policy appeared to be manifestly in a "state of flux" and 
"evolution"), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1970). 
193. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413 
(D.C. Cir. 1983). 
194. "(A]brupt shifts in policy do constitute 'danger signals' that the Commission 
may be acting inconsistently with its statutory mandate." Id. at 1425; cf. Greater Boston, 
444 F.2d at 852. 
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nificant change in its enforcement, would similarly trigger a hard 
look: 1011 " 
Considered in light of earlier decisions, the FCC's subtle 
changes in fairness doctrine requirements stand as genuine de-
partures from stare decisis. The Commission increased the bur-
den on complainants to the point that a successful fairness doc-
trine complaint became nearly impossible to bring. By this 
action, the FCC arbitrarily and capriciously departed from its 
previous holdings and from the purpose set for it by Congress. 
Courts will uphold changes in an agency's policy if the agency 
explains its actions. These explanations enable the courts to re-
view the underlying grounds for the Commission's decision and 
assess whether the Commission has followed its legislative pur-
pose and has acted reasonably.196 Courts have held unexplained 
departure from previous case law arbitrary, capricious, and an 
abuse of discretion. 197 In a review of FCC adjudication of a li-
censing petition,198 the District of Columbia Circuit described 
the level of explanation required: "[A]n agency changing its 
course must supply a reasoned analysis indicating that prior pol-
icies and standards are being deliberately changed, not casually 
ignored, and if an agency glosses over or swerves from prior 
195. Courts do not require the total elimination of a longstanding policy to invoke a 
hard look review. In United Church of Christ, 707 F.2d at 1413, the court invoked strin-
gent review when the FCC replaced its traditional broadcast log books with a more re-
laxed form of broadcast recordkeeping. Because a significant lessening in the enforce-
ment of a traditional agency responsibility is just as much of a signal that an agency is 
abusing its legislative purpose as a total repeal of that responsibility would be, a relaxa-
tion of the long-standing policy enforcing the fairness doctrine will also trigger a hard 
look review. 
196. Id. 
197. See Barrett Line v. United States, 326 U.S. 179 (1945); Contractors Transp. 
Corp. v. United States, 537 F.2d 1160, 1162 (4th Cir. 1976) ("Patently inconsistent appli-
cation of agency standards to similar situations lacks rationality and is arbitrary."); see 
also NLRB v. Don Juan, Inc., 178 F.2d 625 (2d Cir. 1964). But see FCC v. WOKO, Inc. 
329 U.S. 223 (1946) (allowing an unexplained deviation from precedent if the departure 
was reasonable and defensible). 
Although this may seem to depart from the high level of deference usually accorded 
Commission decisions, applying the arbitrary and capricious standard in a strenuous re-
view of agency decisions that break from precedent is, in fact, highly deferential to the 
Commission's previous position. The courts view an agency's settled course of behavior 
as the agency's interpretation of its responsibilities under its congressional mandate. Mo-
tor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41-42 (1983); 
American Trucking Ass'n v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry., 387 U.S. 397, 416 (1967). To swerve 
from this course is to depart from an interpretation of congressional intent to which the 
courts will hold the agencies. 
198. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir.) (Leventhal, 
J.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1970). 
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precedents without discussion it may cross the line from the tol-
erably terse to the intolerably mute.199 
The intolerable muteness that accompanied the Commission's 
covert deregulation of the fairness doctrine would alone have 
been grounds for courts to demand that the Commission supply 
some findings of fact that the courts could review.200 In the ab-
sence of such an explanation, the courts may not simply suppose 
that the Commission's actions comport with the law. The law, in 
fact, demands that, when faced with the unexplained change in 
policy found in the fairness doctrine situation, the presumption 
is against the legitimacy of the agency's change, and the policy 
change would be considered arbitrary and capricious. 
The Commission's repeal of the fairness doctrine in Syracuse 
Peace Council ostensibly supplies the reasoning to support the 
repeal.201 Yet under a hard look review, the repeal and the fac-
tual material from the 1985 Fairness Report underlying the re-
peal are subject to the scrutiny of a reviewing court. In such a 
circumstance, the courts are able to look deeper, beyond the 
substantial evidence test, to the validity of the evidence used by 
the Commission. The factual weaknesses of the evidence used 
by the FCC to conclude that the fairness doctrine engenders a 
chilling effect and the legal errors found in the Commission's 
definition of scarcity provide sufficient evidence that the Com-
mission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in finally repealing the 
fairness doctrine. 
2. Rulemaking- Aside from being a matter of adjudication, 
FCC restriction of fairness doctrine enforcement also involves 
the rulemaking functions of the Commission. If the Commission 
were to have announced and explained its nonenforcement pol-
icy in a rulemaking proceeding, the departure from previous de-
cisions evidenced by changes in the Commission's handling of 
fairness doctrine adjudications could have been reviewed by the 
courts, and the decisions of the Commission could have been 
found reasonable. Courts demand that agencies announce and 
explain changes in policy. 202 The courts then consider the ade-
quacy of the explanation for the policy change and consider that 
explanation in light of the arbitrary and capricious standard. 
199. Id. at 852 (footnotes omitted). 
200. Id. at 850. 
201. Syracuse Peace Council, 63 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 541 (1987), appeal docketed, 
No. 87-1516 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 14, 1987). . 
202. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F) (1982); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 
841 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1970). 
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The court's hard look review in Office of Communications of 
the United Church of Christ v. FCC203 examined the Commis-
sion's reasoning and analysis and found it inadequate because 
the Commission failed to sufficiently consider alternatives. 20" 
The court remanded the FCC deregulation of logging2011 and con-
cluded with a stern rebuke to the Commission: "In these pro-
ceedings the Commission has on its own undertaken to enact a 
significant deregulation of the radio industry. In so doing it has 
pushed hard against the inherent limitations and natural read-
ing of the Coll_).munications Act. "206 
In applying this same level of review to FCC fairness doctrine 
action, the courts would look for a justification of Commission 
rulemaking. Yet, the Commission's policy of ignoring fairness 
doctrine violations was unannounced and undefined in any Com-
mission rulemaking. Nowhere in Commission regulations or pol-
icy statements were the prerepeal fairness doctrine standards 
described, or alternatives discussed, nor were explanations given 
for any change of policy. In fact, the regulations and Commis-
sion statements still contained the traditional FCC standards for 
enforcement of the doctrine. The Commission, then, failed to 
announce its shift in policy in any reviewable form. 
The 1985 Fairness Report does not satisfy the requirement for 
a statement of policy. The process that produced the 1985 Re-
port began as a notice of inquiry preliminary to the type of 
rulemaking necessary to officially announce and explain a 
change of policy.207 The resulting Fairness Report, however, does 
not stand as a reviewable explanation or justification for the 
FCC's de facto repeal of the fairness doctrine for two reasons. 
First, the report explicitly concluded that the FCC could not re-
peal the fairness doctrine on its own and would not modify or 
restrict the scope of the doctrine. 208 The Commission chose not 
to proceed with rulemaking that could eliminate or modify the 
fairness doctrine because it was uncertain whether Congress had 
codified the doctrine. Rather, the FCC def erred to Congress. 
203. 707 F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
204. Id. at 1439-40. 
205. Id. at 1443. Judge Bork concurred, "We remand on the issue of program logs so 
that the Commission may reexamine the matter and provide more thoughtful and de-
tailed justification." Id. The FCC responded by increasing the content of the log replace-
ments, the "issues program lists." Deregulation of Radio, 55 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1401 
(1984). 
206. United Church of Christ, 707 F.2d at 1443. 
207. Inquiry into the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 
49 Fed. Reg. 20,317 (1984). 
208. 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 2, at 35,453. 
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Second, the 1985 Fairness Report does not announce a sub-
stantive rulemaking. The Report announces a general statement 
of policy. The 1985 Fairness Report is simply an announcement 
of facts that the agency would like the courts and Congress to 
consider in an FCC-recommended reassessment of the doctrine. 
As a general statement of policy, the Report does not represent 
an officially reviewable explanation of Commission action and 
has as much impact as a Commission press release.209 Without 
any explanation of its actions available, the Commission lacked 
the record necessary for courts to review the agency's actions. As 
such, those actions taken before the repeal were arbitrary and 
capricious. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the law allows the FCC a certain amount of discre-
tion in interpreting and enforcing the fairness doctrine, the FCC 
has gone beyond its discretion and has violated its legislative 
mandate by feebly enforcing and finally repealing the fairness 
doctrine. The extreme decline in the number of cases enforced 
before the repeal and the repeal itself indicate this. The Com-
mission's decisions increasing the burden on a fairness doctrine 
petitioner while eliminating broadcasting procedures that peti-
209. Radio-Television News Directors Ass'n v. FCC, 809 F.2d 860, 862 (D.C. Cir.) 
("[T]he 1985 Fairness Report's conclusions as to the constitutionality of the fairness doc-
trine do not constitute agency action subject to review .... "), vacated, 831 F.2d 1148 
(1987); see also Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 38-39 
(D.C. Cir. 1974) ("An agency cannot escape its responsibility to present evidence and 
reasoning supporting its substantive rules by announcing binding precedent in the form 
of a general statement of policy."). A court could decide that the Commission acted rea-
sonably in changing fairness doctrine policy because the doctrine deterred free speech. 
The court could not, however, use the 1985 Fairness Report to justify the decision. Al-
though the 1985 Fairness Report proceeding involved a fairly sophisticated hearing pro-
cess, the fact that the FCC announced that the Report was preliminary to a reconsidera-
tion of the fairness doctrine prevented the Commission from claiming that the Report 
was a binding statement. See CBS v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942). If the Commis-
sion was to incorporate or refer to the 1985 Fairness Report in a later action, as the 
Commission did in Syracuse Peace Council, then the Report would constitute a review-
able document. See Committee to Save WEAM v. FCC, 808 F.2d 113, 118 (D.C. Cir. 
1986). 
Had the 1985 Fairness Report been a genuine rulemaking procedure, there would be a 
slight chance that the Commission could have been able to "freeze" enforcement of the 
doctrine during the proceedings. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE Ac-
TIONS 588 & n.167 (noting Kessler v. FCC, 326 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1963), in which the 
court upheld the Commission's "freeze" on consideration of broadcast frequency applica-
tions while the Commission promulgated new rules that might affect the application 
process). 
SPRING 1987] The Fairness Doctrine 847 
tioners could use to prove their case also prove that the agency 
violated its mandate. The repeal action, taken without the au-
thorization of Congress and without sufficient justification, was 
arbitrary and capricious. Applying the standards of administra-
tive law to the Commission's actions, the Commission has vio-
lated its statutory purpose under the public interest standard of 
the Communications Act of 1934, the 1959 amendments to that 
act, and the 1986 budget provision. 
Altogether, when one views the FCC's responsibility for en-
forcement of the fairness doctrine, it becomes clear that the 
Commission has contravened its purpose of ensuring the fairness 
of the airwaves. The Commission has decided to engage in law-
making, without the constitutional authority of the legislative 
process, by engaging in covert and overt deregulation of a signifi-
cant piece of broadcast law. That law, the fairness doctrine, may 
be a flawed piece of public policy,210 but if so, then one may con-
clude with the District of Columbia Circuit that, "It should thus 
be Congress, and not the unrepresentative bureaucracy and judi-
ciary, that takes the lead in grossly amending [the broadcasting] 
system."211 
-Michael J. Bolton 
210. For an argument that the fairness doctrine, even as originally enforced, is com-
pletely unworkable, see Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 102, at 157 ("[T)he Fairness 
Doctrine is . . . a glorious but futile symbol, full of wondrous pretension and promise, 
yet utterly devoid of performance."). 
211. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413, 
1443 (D.C. Cir. 1983). But Congress is not quietly allowing the FCC to usurp its role. 
Congressional reaction to the repeal was furious. For FCC, 6-Year Fairness Struggle, 
N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1987, at A21, col. 1; The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, supra note 
150, at 59 (quoting Rep. Dingell). Much of the congressional anger was directed at the 
Commission for repealing the doctrine after formal and informal statements that it 
would not do so. A Question of Priorities, BROADCASTING, Aug. 10, 1987, at 28; FCC Gets 
Earful at Telcomsubcom House Hearing, BROADCASTING, June 1, 1987, at 33-34 (state-
ment of FCC Chairman, Dennis Patrick, that the agency did not intend to change its 
enforcement of the doctrine). 
Congress has reacted by attempting to recodify the fairness doctrine. See e.g., Broad-
casters Take the Offensive Against Fairness/Fees, BROADCASTING, Nov. 2, 1987, at 34; 
Fairness Update, BROADCASTING, Nov. 2, 1987, at 12; Davis, Fairness Doctrine Bill is 
Approved By Senate Panel, Wall St. J., Oct. 22, 1987, at 12, col. 1; Fuerbringer, Con-
gress Passes Bill to Cut Deficit, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1987, at Al, col. 4 (attempt to pass 
fairness doctrine in 1988 budget bill fails); Rasky, Stopgap Appropriation Bill Ap-
proved, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1987, at Al 7, col. 4; supra note 139. Congress has also 
begun exert pressure on the FCC as reprisal for the Commission's veto of the doctrine. 
See Washington Wire, Wall St. J., Feb. 12, 1988, at 1, col. 5. 
Any legislation reinvigorating the fairness doctrine should not only remedy the Com-
mission's overt repeal of the doctrine in 1987, but should also seek to prevent the covert 
repeal of the doctrine that occurred long before that time. 

